

Table Of Contents

Chapters	Page #
----------	--------

1. SOUTH ASIA: A HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

06

INDUS VALLEY CIVILIZATION.	06
----------------------------	----

EVOLUTION OF THE TERM INDIA.	07
------------------------------	----

THE DAWN OF THE INDIAN CIVILIZATION.	09
--------------------------------------	----

THE FIRST IMPERIAL UNIFICATION OF THE SUBCONTINENT.	11
--	----

ARABS & CENTRAL ASIAN INVASIONS.	12
----------------------------------	----

THE BRITISH ADVENT IN MARITIME.	13
---------------------------------	----

COLONIALISM:

DIVERSITY IN PRE-CAPITALIST SOCIETIES.

COLONIALISM, CAPITALISM & DEVELOPMENT.

STAGES OF COLONIALISM & CAPITALISM.

THE POWER OF COLONIAL STATES.

FEATURES OF COLONIAL RULE.

BRITISH COLONIAL IMPERIALISM: 14

TRANSITION TO COLONIALISM.	14
COMPANY RAJ AND INDIAN SOCIETY 1757-1857.	17
INDIA BETWEEN EMPIRES: DECLINE OR DECENTRALIZATION.	20
1857 REBELLION & COLLABORATION.	24

HIGH NOON OF COLONIALISM.

STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL CONTROL.	27
-------------------------------	----

PARTITION OF INDIA: 35

REFORMIST MOVEMENTS (SIR SYED & RAJO RAMOHON ROY)	35
THE BEGINNING OF COMMUNAL POLITICS. AIML	42
THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN.	45
MINTO'S TOBA-TAIK-SING.	
FILM: 1947-EARTH.	

AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY: 48

THE COLONIAL LEGACY IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.	48
--	----

THE VICEREGAL SYSTEM.

PAKISTAN-THE FORMATIVE PHASE.

DEMOCRACY IN INDIA.

INDIA'S DEMOCRATIC FEDERALISM.

RELIGION'S INFLUENCE IN SOUTH ASIA:

56

THE CONCEPT OF JIHAD IN ISLAM 56

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM [ARRIVAL OF MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN (From Political
Islam to Militant Islam)] 61

MADARIS. 65

HINDU REVIVALISM (HINDUTVA). 71

CONTEMPERORY ISSUES IN RELIGION (i.e. HUDOOD ORDINANCE,
BLASMPHY LAW).

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Module 1 SOUTH ASIA: A HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

INDUS VALLEY CIVILIZATION

Hegel, the famous German philosopher, gave a not untypical nineteenth-century description of **India as an object of desire**: ‘From the most ancient times downwards, all nations have directed their wishes and longings to gaining access to the treasure of this land of marvels, the most costly which the Earth presents; treasures of Nature-pearls, diamonds, perfumes, rose-essences, elephants, lions, etc.-as also treasures of wisdom. The way by which these treasures have passed to the West, has at all times been a matter of World-historical importance, bound up with the fate of nations’.

He added approvingly, ‘the English, or rather the East-India Company are the lords of the land; for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic Empire to be subjected to Europeans...’

India-the land of wisdom and wealth:

India is real:

Iqbal’s Tarana-i-Hindi (1904): *Sarey jahan sey acha, ye Hindustan hamara*

Hum bulbelen hain iske, ye gulistan hamara

Modernity and Antiquity: interpretation of Ancient India:

Nehru in his book ‘discovery of India’ said ‘the continuity of a cultural tradition through five thousand years of history which made the 180 years of British rule in India seem like just one of the unhappy interludes in her long story’. And on the opening page of ‘the Indian Struggle’ Subhash Chandra Bose emphasized two features critical to an understanding of India: first, its history had to be reckoned not in decades or in centuries

but in thousands of years; and second, only under British rule India for the first time in her history had begun to feel that she had been conquered. Among others than the above mentioned nationalist leaders, there were British Orientalists, Indian traditionalists and revivalists Hindu as well as Muslims, each possessing an implicit if not explicit political agenda.

British orientalists and Gandhian utopians have made the task complicated for us to know the South Asia's pre-modern history.

The Truth Unearthed: It was in 1922 that the age of Indian history was suddenly extended by a millennium and a half archaeological excavation unearthed the ruins of a quite stunning civilization in the Indus Valley region, with two key urban centers at Mohenjodaro and Harappa. Their urban planning of streets and drainage system is one example of their sophistication and advancement. Artifacts found there have indicated the existence of long-distance trade with other great ancient civilization-Mesopotami. ...Excavated by John Marshall.

An Amazing Civilization: One of the first sites where humans developed the art of agriculture and created a whole civilization based on it.

Harappa and Moen-Jo-Daro: Oldest, largest, well-organized cities ever built by humans. These two large and well-planned cities are not just the subcontinent's first planned cities where the very first of their kind built by humankind anywhere in the world. The Indus civilization is supposed to have been twice the size of the contemporary Egyptian Civilization and almost four times that of the Sumerian Civilization in Mesopotamia (modern Iraq).

EVOLUTION OF THE TERM INDIA

Bharat in Sanskrit, *Hind* in Persian, *Indica* in Greek, *al-Hind* in Arabic and *Hindustan* in Urdu (The victorious Greeks changed the name of the river from Hind to Indos and that of the country to Indica.

In 343-321 BC, the term 'Bharat' had begun to denote the Ganges valley instead of the Indus valley that had been taken over by the Achameanian Empire.

In 323 BC, the year Alexander's death in Babylon, the Indo-Aryans of the Ganges valley led by Chandragupta, the founder of the Mauryan empire defeated the Greeks in Indica and reabsorbed the Indus valley into Bharat after a lapse of several centuries.

Due to many different historical names, the term South Asia is preferred over the term India.

INDUS VALLEY CIVILIZATION:

Aryans' Arrival:

Destruction of the Indus Valley Civilization:

Aryans: Spoke Sanskrit ...Arya means noble, the name they gave to the site of the Indus civilization was 'Bharatvarsha'-the land of 'Bharat' who was their leader. Modern India has adopted both Bharat and India as its official language.

'Septa Sindhu' in Sanskrit, which literally means 'seven rivers'...Sindhu became Hind in Persian

Indian Civilization: later on the Aryans moved eastwards to the Ganges Valley where their civilization flourished during the first millennium BC and became the Indian civilization.

Caste System: Introduction of caste system...Aryans debased the darker Indus basin dwellers (Darwinians) in social status.

THE INDIAN CIVILIZATION

The Vedic Era (the era that followed the Aryans triumph over the Indus people is called the early Vedic period. Adopted a more settled life, depended on rain (indra), sun (surya), fire (agni). Sacrifices needed...the special memorized knowledge (of the holy books-Vedas) of the priest class or Brahmana helped in creating a hereditary class of priest or Brahmins who in turn handled powerful gods to save their crops, leaders (rajas) and cattle.

The Rig-Veda (it contains information about the lifestyle, organization and aspiration of the Aryans. It is a collection of miscellaneous fragments of old legends, chants and hymns. The hymns are not so much for spiritual enlightenment as for victory, power, wealth and food. According to Bhandarkar and other indologists, the hymns of the Rig-Veda are saturated with selfish sordid (ignoble) aims.

The Rig-Veda mentions mortal conflict with the local inhabitants, presumably Dravidians who are identified as hostile in speech, nose-less, irreligious and black.

The holy books were kept them to themselves. Their possession ensured control over the performance of the rituals and gave the Brahmans high social status and important privileges in the Vedic society

The Cast System: The Sanskrit for cast is varna and jati. Varna is used to categorize the four groups: Brahmana (priest and educators), Kshatriya (Warriors) Vaisya (cultivators and traders) and Shudras (dasas-slaves). Not all the indigenous people became part of the shudras varna. It appears some big clans were co-opted in the first three varnas because of their contribution.

Vedic interpretation done only by the Brahmans...later on it was said that one had to be born Brahman.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE INDIAN CIVILIZATION

Two important developments mark the evolution of the Indian civilization: One religious viz. the rise of Jainism and Buddhism, and the other political viz. the rise of the Magadha state.

RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT:

Jainism (Mahavira (Jina means conqueror) Vardhamane-his own name. he was more a reformer than the founder of Jainism. He came from a long line of 'enlightened teachers'. He was the 24th and the last of these teachers. He prescribed an extremely ascetic life

characterized by non-violence (ahimsa) and aversion to kill or participate in the killing of any form of life, from the animals down to vegetables. They shunned all business activities that involved taking any life at any stage. Early Jainism had a streak of selfishness in the struggle for one's own salvation. A Jain had to eat but he would rather let someone else commit the sin of uprooting plants than add the load of sin to his soul. Jainism does not provide, therefore, a universal social code. Its emphasis is entirely on the quest for individual deliverance.

Buddhism (Gautama Siddharta...nirvana...later on divided into Hinayana (the orthodox school) and Mahayana)

Revival of Brahmanism: Deeply affected by the religious revolt in the shape of Jainism and Buddhism, the vedic religion transformed itself into Hinduism. This synthesis retained the caste system, including the primacy of the Brahmans. It reduced, however, the role of the Brahmans in attaining spiritual bliss. Many tenets taken from Jainism and Buddhism including the abhorrence to killing animals and abstention from consuming meat became part and parcel of Hinduism over the centuries.

The synthesis had also affected the Buddhism and Jain religion. Buddha was declared an avatar (representative reflection) of Lord Vishnu. Many converts to Buddhism were brought back into the fold of Hinduism...diehard Buddhism were suppressed hard with the result not many remained today in the land where Buddhism was born.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:

The Mauryan Empire (Chandragupta Maurya...Kautilya's Arthashastra (Doctrine of material gain). Kautilya's Saptanga theory-that a state includes seven elements i.e. king, ministers, territory, fort, finance, army and allies. His foreign Policy-'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'

THE FIRST IMPERIAL UNIFICATION OF THE SUBCONTINENT

It is amazing how almost 2,300 years ago with primitive modes of transport and communication and other problems, the Mauryan king was able to administer the vast country in an efficient manner.

Ashoka: Like the Harappan culture, Ashoka's contribution to Indian culture was unknown until about a hundred and fifty years ago in 1837.

A priest kind used to address his subjects as 'my children'.

He is supposed to have sent his daughter to Sri-Lanka with a message of peace, inviting that country's ruler to adopt the Buddhist faith.

Ashoka's 'dharmo-chakra' (wheel of the law) appears in the center of the Indian flag.

POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF THE SUBCONTINENT:

The Mauryan Empire had disintegrated politically but the Indian Civilization managed not only to retain the moral and cultural unity created by Ashoka the great but indeed to flourish

Racial Intermingling: As the Northern and North Western part of the Subcontinent had been mostly the place of habitat of the foreign invading forces; therefore, the racial consequences are more noticeable today in the north than in the south.

THE CLASSICAL AGE OF HINDUISM:

(THE SECOND IMPERIAL UNIFICATION)

The Gupta Era: The second Imperial Unification of the Subcontinent. The Gupta period is well known for the production of the secular and fundamentally optimistic literature in poetry, prose and drama. The significant themes for poetry were love, nature, story telling and morals.

ARABS AND CENTRAL ASIAN INVASION

Arabs: 712 AD.

Central Asian conquerors had always turned to the Subcontinent when their fortunes waned on their own habitat or when they were looking for additional territory for enhancing their revenues. When the Central Asia became Muslim, their invasion began to be called Muslim invasion. This creates an impression as if these invasions were due specifically to the nature and spread of Islam

Delhi Sultanate:

THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

The Turko-Afghans ruled from strong forts that were maintained as armed camps to guard against the indigenous population. But the Mughals established a compact with the Hindu Rajputs, and in a way, began to live with and among them.

Akbar (deen-i-illahi)

Aurangzeb (the contradiction on Aurangzeb's policies surfaced in the form of widespread rebellion among his Hindu and Sikh subjects. These two communities had been militarized at least partly by the negative impact of the strong-arm Mughal policies.

Aurangzeb's messianic vision...that his ancestors were at fault...he wanted to make the whole subcontinent an ideal Islamic state.

He died in 1707, left behind an unstable, ungovernable and dying empire)

Nadir Shah's Invasion (1739): Followed by Abdali

Delhi massacre, looting, and plundering: What the Indians could not do against him, however, the Afghans did. They assassinated Nadir Shah in 1747, took over his mantle and replaced Iranian invasion with Afghan invasion (Ahmad Shah Abdali).

THE BRITISH ADVENT IN MARITIME TRADE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Mughals like Chinese had ruled continental empires for centuries unaware of the increasing role that naval power was beginning to play in the distribution of power on the world. They were aloof from the changes taking place in Europe. The other significant fact is that, while the Ottomans and the Chinese did wake up to reality and introduced modernization in their countries, though a little too late, the Mughals never woke up.

The discovery of Cape of Good Hope in 1488:

Vasco-de-Gama arrived in India in 1498:

Foreigners' struggle amongst each other: Franco-Dutch struggle, Anglo-French and Anglo-Dutch struggle and Struggle with Indian princes

East Indian Company.

The Battle of Plassey 1757:

The Crown Raj- Post 1857

Indian Civilization could not be changed: Now, the Princes appeared to be the buffers between the British rulers and their subjects, they had to be created rather than dispensed with (get rid of), they were going to be partners rather than adversaries in governing India. The attempt of imposing western culture and expecting the Indians to become totally westernized, this policy was changed and the British government realized this fact that east can never become west, as it is clear from Kipling famous phrase 'the east is east and the west is west and never the twain shall meet'.

Module 3: BRITISH COLONIAL IMPERIALISM:

3.1 THE TRANSITION TO COLONIALISM: RESISTANCE AND COLLABORATION

In Mid-eighteenth century the Mughal successor states were replaced by British domination.

The British domination of India, which started from the conquest of Bengal in 1757, culminates on the annexation of the state of Awadh in 1850.

Any interpretation of the transition to colonialism in India must address a set of related issues: the impetus behind European expansion; the reasons for colonial conquest in an era of decolonization and informal empire in other parts of the world; the basis of collaboration between the English East India company and Indian intermediate social groups and, finally, the critical factors which brought the British success.

Background of Western Enticement towards India:

From Traders to Rulers

In early 18th century the flow of silver from Europe to Asia:

The internal contradictions in the economy and politics of India in late 18th century and the withdrawal of support by commercial and financial magnates to the successor states contributed in the British quest to control India financially and politically.

Military fiscalism of the Sultans brought a congruence of interests between the English East India Company and Indian merchant capitalists.

European dominance over external trade and shipping, and hence over long-distance cash flows, as well as their slight edge in military technology, contributed to the wrecking of the 18th century Indian state system.

Rivalry amongst the Western Powers:

Anglo-French proxy wars.

Lack of effective support from the metropolis and the superiority of the English at sea ensured that the French were eventually checkmated.

Indigenous Resistant Forces:

The strongest resistance to the British was by the state of Mysore, the Marathas, and the Sikhs.

Indigenous Collaborators:

But there was also a strong strand of collaboration by Indian social groups, especially merchant capitalists, who helped undermine the regional states which they had bankrolled in the past.

Sirajuddaula's defeat-fall of Bengal 1757.

Colonel Robert Clive conspiracy with the local Bengali merchant bankers Jagat Seth and Omichand, who in turn intrigued with Siraj's disaffected general, Mir Jaffar.

The battle of Buxar (1764) saw the company breaking the back of the last organized armed resistance to their control over eastern India.

In 1765 the British obtained from the Mughal emperor the diwani, or the right to collect all the revenues, from Bengal. It was an apt conclusion to the colonial transition in Bengal since it was the streamlined flow of revenues from the great zamindars, organized in the

days of the Mughal subadar Murshid Auli Khan, which had made Bengal such an attractive proposition for the English in the first place. The availability of land revenue conveniently obviated the need to bring in silver from Europe.

The Company used their military force only after securing the collaboration of certain Indian intermediate social groups.

Subsidiary Alliance System:

The financial demands of the alliance merely served to erode the basis of the state, and ultimately to provide the conditions for British annexation. Among the more important subsidiary allies, only Hyderabad escaped outright annexation, probably because the company did not wish to bear the costs of administering this large and sparsely populated territory.

The state of Mysore: As late as the 1790s Mysore had a growing economy both in the rural and urban sectors. Mysore was also closing the gap in military technology between Europeans and Indians.

But it was not until 1799 that the faster expanding economic resources of the British, who controlled the more productive coastal areas and had the use of fractions of indigenous capital, tilted the balance decisively against a defiant Mysore.

Maratha confederacy: defeated in 1818

British Conquests:

In 1842 Sind falls...Hotchands of Sind

Sikh state (Punjab) falls in 1849.

Ending remarks:

A close analysis of the transition to colonialism in India reveals the resistance offered by many of the regional successor states of the Mughal Empire, as well as the interlocking relations between the English East India Company and indigenous merchant capitalist.

The pressures exerted by British capital and the company state on Indian polities undermined the 18th century state system.

The Company state moved firmly to cut the cord between Indian commerce and political power which had contributed to the undoing of the indigenous states and had the potential to threaten the colonialists.

Having risen to a position of dominance by riding the wave of a relatively vibrant 18th economy, the British resorted to a form of conquistador imperialism which contributed in no uncertain way to the economic stagnation of the early 19th century.

3.2 COMPANY RAJ AND INDIAN SOCIETY, 1757 TO 1857: REINVENTION AND REFORM OF TRADITION

Indian society's negotiation of western influences and pressures under company raj is a matter of wide disagreement between 19th century writers and contemporary scholars, and also among modern historians of the subcontinent.

From the early 19th century, in particular, three potent forces of change were thought to have been unleashed on Indian society: 1. doctrine of **free trade**, 2. the ideology of **utilitarianism** through good English law to do away with backward, if not evil, Indian social customs, 3. **evangelism** to Christianize and uplift hapless colonial subjects.

Revisionist historians have recently pointed out that these expectations not only remained largely unfulfilled and misplaced but dramatic social changes such as these may never have been attempted in the first place. In other words, there was a gulf between ideological currents in the west and colonial social policy in India during the first place.

As part of their search **for social stability**, the British gave **substance to caste hierarchy** and rigidity dominated by the Brahmins, which had been available in theory but been often ignored in social practice in the immediate pre-colonial era.

The early phase may have been a period of military aggression and economic plunder but it was not one of heavy-handed social intervention by conquerors imbued with a sense of racial superiority.

Devastating changes in **rural India**.

Massive scale **deforestation**, invasion of the nomadic and pastoral economy.

Disruption of tribal lands and the rude intrusion of money into tribal economics.

Support to principles of hierarchy and ritual distinction: British scholars and officials aided by Brahmanical interpretations of Indian society set about the task of rank-ordering Indian social groups in various localities. It is probable that Indian social practice was more hierarchically defined in the first half of the 19th century than it had been during the 18th century.

If colonial social engineering was largely limited to providing selective support to aspects of Indian tradition in the countryside, it allowed more scope for rationalism to have an impact and provoke a response in urban centers.

Hindu college, the first English language higher educational institution, established in 1818.

The western minded 'Young Bengal group' based in Hindu College

Dharma Sabha a conservative reactionary society against the Young Bengal group.

In-between these two, the most creative strand was led by Rammohun Roy who set up a society called the Brahmo Samaj which rejected caste system and idolatry and sought a return to the original monotheistic purity of the Upanishads.

1820s and 1830s is referred as **Bengal renaissance**.

The British attempt to westernize its Indian subjects by introducing its **education system**.

The aim of western education was to 'form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indian in blood and colors but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect.

Urged on by **Macaulay**, Bentinck replaced Persian with English as the official language of the government in 1835.

Hindus accepted the new education system, while majority of the Muslims remained aloof.

Muslims socio-religious reformist movements i.e. 'Tahreek-a-Shaheedain, Faraizi Movement etc.

Muslim reformist movements were ambivalent in their attitude towards colonial rule since they believed that internal strengthening had to precede any reassertion of Islamic power.

Social resistance was a key feature throughout the first century of colonial rule.

Ending Remarks:

Indian society was astir throughout the period of colonial consolidation under the company state. Resistance was widespread, affecting all regions of the subcontinent and a

variety of social groups, including rural magnates, peasants, tribals and urban artisans. What the movements of resistance lacked were first, supra-local organization and, second, convergence in time-through the 1830s must be regarded as a decade of more than usual unrest. The great civilian uprisings which accompanied the military mutiny of 1857 aimed at supplying these missing ingredients.

**THE TRANSITION TO COLONIALISM:
RESISTANCE AND COLLABORATION
(The Company Raj 1757-1858)**

Background:

- In Mid-eighteenth century the Mughal successor states were replaced by British domination.
- The British domination of India, which started from the conquest of Bengal in 1757, culminates on the annexation of the state of Awadh in 1850.
- The Strongest organized resistance to British expansion came from the great warrior states of Mysore, the Marathas, and the Sikhs. But there was also a strong capitalist, who helped undermine the regional states which they had bankrolled in the past.
- Any interpretation of the transition to colonialism in India must address a set of related issues: the impetus behind European expansion; the reasons for colonial conquest in an era of decolonization and informal empire in other parts of the world; the basis of collaboration between the English East India company and Indian intermediate social groups and, finally, the critical factors which brought the British success.

Western Enticement towards India: From Traders to Rulers

- In early 18th century the flow of silver from Europe to Asia:

- The internal contradictions in the economy and politics of India in late 18th century and the withdrawal of support by commercial and financial magnates to the successor states contributed in the British quest to control India financially and politically.
- **‘Military fiscalism’ of the Sultans** brought a congruence of interests between the English East India Company and Indian merchant capitalists.
- European dominance over external trade and shipping, and hence over long-distance cash flows, as well as their slight edge in military technology, contributed to the wrecking of the 18th century Indian state system.

Rivalry amongst the Western Powers:

- Anglo-French proxy wars.
- Lack of effective support from the metropolis and the superiority of the English at sea ensured that the French were eventually checkmated.

Indigenous Resistant Forces:

- The strongest resistance to the British was by the state of Mysore, the Marathas, and the Sikhs.

Indigenous Collaborators:

- But there was also a strong strand of collaboration by Indian social groups, especially merchant capitalists, who helped undermine the regional states which they had bankrolled in the past.
- Sirajuddaula’s defeat-fall of Bengal 1757.
- Colonel Robert Clive conspiracy with the local Bengali merchant bankers Jagat Seth and Omichand, who in turn intrigued with Siraj’s disaffected general, Mir Jaffar.
- The battle of Buxar (1764) saw the company breaking the back of the last organized armed resistance to their control over eastern India.
- In 1765 the British obtained from the Mughal emperor the diwani, or the right to collect all the revenues, from Bengal. It was an apt conclusion to the colonial transition in Bengal since it was the streamlined flow of revenues from the great zamindars, organized in the days of the Mughal subadar Murshid Auli Khan,

which had made Bengal such an attractive proposition for the English in the first place. The availability of land revenue conveniently obviated the need to bring in silver from Europe.

- The Company used their military force only after securing the collaboration of certain Indian intermediate social groups.
- **Subsidiary Alliance System:** The Subsidiary Alliance system was a method perfected by Lord Wellesley to subjugate Indian powers without the cost and botheration of war. Any Indian ruler, whose security was threatened, was encouraged to seek help and enter into an alliance with the English, who promised to protect the ruler from external attacks and internal revolts. The Indian ruler had to accept certain terms and conditions. This arrangement was known as Subsidiary Alliance. Some conditions were:
 - 1) British troops (for the protection of the Indian ruler) would be permanently placed in the territory of the subsidiary state, but the ruler would have to pay for the maintenance of the troops. Payment could be made either in cash or in kind, i.e., by ceding part of his territory.
 - 2) He had to keep a British official (Resident) at his court.
 - 3) He could not employ any Europeans (except English) in his service and dismiss those who were already there.
 - 4) He cannot form any alliance with any other power or declare war against any power without the permission of the English.
 - 5) He would have to acknowledge the English Company as the paramount power.
- The financial demands of the alliance merely served to erode the basis of the state, and ultimately to provide the conditions for British annexation. Among the more important subsidiary allies, only Hyderabad escaped outright annexation, probably because the company did not wish to bear the costs of administering this large and sparsely populated territory.

The State of Mysore:

- As late as the 1790s Mysore had a growing economy both in the rural and urban sectors. Mysore was also closing the gap in military technology between Europeans and Indians.

- But it was not until 1799 that the faster expanding economic resources of the British, who controlled the more productive coastal areas and had the use of fractions of indigenous capital, tilted the balance decisively against a defiant Mysore.
- Maratha confederacy: defeated in 1818

British Conquests:

- In 1842 Sind falls...Hotchands of Sind
- Sikh state (Punjab) falls in 1849.

The wars against Punjab, Sind and Afghanistan had naturally drained the treasury. Dalhousie sought to recoup some of the costs of these expensive states. Utilizing the **'doctrine of lapse'**, by which subsidiary states without a natural male heir conveniently fell into the hands of the company, Dalhousie took over Satara in 1848, Jhansi in 1853, and Nagpur in 1854-these brought some five million pounds in revenue.

Last final conquest-annexation of Awadh in 1856.

Ending Remarks:

A close analysis of the transition to colonialism in India reveals the resistance offered by many of the regional successor states of the Mughal Empire, as well as the interlocking relations between the English East India Company and indigenous merchant capitalist.

The pressures exerted by British capital and the company state on Indian polities undermined the 18th century state system.

The Company state moved firmly to cut the cord between Indian commerce and political power which had contributed to the undoing of the indigenous states and had the potential to threaten the colonialists.

Having risen to a position of dominance by riding the wave of a relatively vibrant 18th economy, the British resorted to a form of conquistador imperialism which contributed in no uncertain way to the economic stagnation of the early 19th century.

THE FIRST CENTURY OF BRITISH RULE, 1757 TO 1857:

STATE AND ECONOMY

- From Oceanic traders to land rules
- **Continuity between Pre-colonial and Colonial era:** The early colonial edifice was undoubtedly built on the foundation of existing indigenous arrangements, institutions and identities which had not lost their vitality during the phase of political decentralization prior to the colonial advance. But it is important not to lose sight of the colonial state as a key actor in bringing about major changes within economy and society.
- **Military Despotism:** The essence of the company state as it developed in the late 18th century was military despotism.
- **Bengal Army:** The total strength of the company's armed forces increased dramatically during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, from 115,000 in 1790 to 155,000 in 1805. This made it one of the largest European-style standing armies in the world. A standing army of this sort was a novelty in the history of institutions of state in India.
- The Company's centralized civilian bureaucracy: formal authority over the company's Indian affairs was exercised by the court of directors in London. Lord North's regulating act of 1773 and Pitt's India act of 1784 attempted to bring the company's administration under the supervision of parliament through a board of control.
- The colonial bureaucracy racially exclusive and distant from the lower levels of Indian clerkdom.

- **Subsidiary Alliance System:** Outside the directly administered territories the company entered into a series of treaty arrangements with a range of Indian rulers.
- **Indirect rule:** The colonial construct of indirect rule was an ingenious device that complemented and did not contradict the efficacy (effectiveness) of direct British colonial rule in other parts of the subcontinent.
- **Deep intervention in Indian Economy and Society:** Military and bureaucratic institutions of the company state in the directly ruled areas were instruments of designed to bolster selective but deep administrative interventions in Indian economy and society. The early colonial state's chief concern was the security and stability of land revenue-the principal source of its income. A variety of mechanisms were created in different parts of India to achieve this end. The earliest and most controversial arrangement was the '**permanent settlement**' of 1793, by which a private property right in revenue collection was assigned to the zamindars of Bengal.
- In the early 19th century the colonial state armed the zamindars with formidable powers of extra-economic coercion, including distraint (seizure of bad debtor's property) and eviction.
- The period from 1757 to the 1810s represented a straightforward plunder of India's revenues.
- During the 1810s India's artisanal economy lost its ability to compete with cheaply manufactured British textiles and to sell its products in foreign markets.
- **Tea and Opium:** China tea had now replaced Indian textiles as the most profitable item of the company's trade. Without control over Indian territories the company would not have been able to survive for half a century after the loss of its Indian trading monopoly.
- The Company's earlier rule (military force and extraction of resources): An analysis of the structure and capacity of the early colonial state, particularly the ways in which it marshaled military force and the extraction of resources from peasants and weavers, suggests it was qualitatively different from the pre-colonial states it had subdued. Having appropriated all that was vital and buoyant in

India's pre-colonial economy, the company state did little to contribute to either economic growth or equity in the early nineteenth century.

- Retaining some of the pre-colonial policies, this was explicitly aimed at minimizing the threat of social reaction.
- Resentment against the company.

3.3 INDIA BETWEEN EMPIRES: DECLINE or DECENTRALIZATION?

The 19th century view of the 18th century as a period of anarchy between the age of Mughal hegemony and the imposition of Pax Britannica?

From a balanced angle of vision the 18th century does not appear any more as a dark valley in the shadow of towering empires. What emerges is a mixed scenario of shadow and light, with high points and low points. It is important in any study of India between empires not to confuse the erosion of power of the Mughal court and army with a more general political, economic and societal decline.

The death of Aurangzeb in 1707 changed the era of the great Mughal from that of the lesser Mughals. The cost of Aurangzeb's military campaigns sorely undermined the financial basis of his empire.

Agrarian-based revolts: Influential historian of the 20th century, Jadunath Sarkar, had read into Maratha, Sikh and Jat resistance a strong element of 'Hindu reaction' against Aurangzeb's religious bigotry. But resistance to Mughal hegemony was not primarily Hindu in composition. Irfan Habib in his classic *The Agrarian System of Mughal India* depicted the revolts as peasant uprisings owing primarily to economic oppression. But revolts against the Mughals appear to have occurred in the relatively prosperous regions

and were usually led by locally wealthy zamindars, which cast some doubt on the validity of the exploitation-poverty-resistance causal chain.

Weak centre and strong regions:

External pressures on the Mughal Empire in the shape of tribal incursions from Central Asia, Eurasia and Afghanistan.

Invasion from the north: in 1739 the Persian king Nadir Shah totally devastated the historical city of Delhi.

In the 1740s the Subadars of Bengal, Awadh and the Deccan turned themselves into Nawabs or independent kings.

In 1761 Ahmad Shah Abdali defeated Marathas-the potential inheritors of India just at a time when the English were beginning to shift from trade to political domination.

In 1757 Clive defeated Sirajuddulah and 1764 the battle of Buxar in Bihar.

In 1765 the Bengal Diwani was given to the Company.

Maratha power had a brief revival under their great leader Mahadaji Scindia in the 1770s and 1780s. In 1784 Scindia won acknowledgment as protector of the Mughal emperor. It was only after overcoming fierce Maratha resistance that the British occupied Delhi in 1803.

The weakening of the Mughal emperor and nobility enabled the strengthening of other groups (e.g. Hindu and Muslim revenue farmers, Hindu and Jain merchants and bankers and Muslim service gentry) who were the products of dynamic process of social mobility and change.

The 18th century saw an increasing devolution of real power to the lower levels of sovereignty.

If the politics of the 18th century was marked more by decentralization than decline, economy and society were characterized by general buoyancy and creativity despite some key weakness and contradictions. The economy did well in the spheres of agriculture, inland trade and urbanization. Urbanization was in its rise than a century before.

It is noteworthy that, except for a major subsistence crisis in south India between 1702 and 1704, the first seven decades of the 18th in India were remarkably free of famine. The great Bengal famine of 1770, in which an estimated one-third of the population perished, occurred soon after the colonial conquest. This was followed by another disastrous famine in north India in 1783.

India in the 18th century held out many attractions for Europeans, particularly the British, who set about to appropriate a relatively buoyant economy by harnessing the dynamic social and political changes taking place to their own advantage. 'A new life which 'seemed about to rise in the regional peoples' was 'cut short by the intrusion of European nations' (Ghose).

3.4 1857: REBELLION, COLLABORATION AND THE TRANSITION TO CROWN RAJ

1857 Uprising?: A sepoy mutiny, war of independence, a pre-colonial restoration struggle, a feudal reaction, a secular movement cutting across communal affiliation or a religiously inspired Jihad or simply an anti-colonial revolt. There was probably a bit of all of these in the complex events of 1857.

Neither military mutiny nor civil revolt was uncommon in early colonial India. But they had in the past been rather disparate and uncoordinated. What gave the 1857 revolt its unique character was the convergence of various strands of resistance, the expansion of scale, and a new level of intensity.

Resentment among the Company's soldiers against the Company's recruitment policy.

The revolt erupted from the rumor that the cartridges used in the new rifles are smeared with cow and pig fats. On the refusal of these cartridges soldiers were sentenced to imprisonment. To see this humiliation of their fellow soldiers, the soldiers of Meerut revolted and marched to Delhi.

Areas of uprising Delhi, Awadh, central India,

The revolt failed: not quick enough to attack British forces the mutineers didn't consolidate their grip over liberated areas in which to establish their own legitimate administration. Collaboration of some of the landed magnates of Banaras and Punjab.

The collaboration of the Bhumihar magnates of Banaras, rivals of the Rajput brotherhoods up in revolt, was a critical element in the success of the British counterattack.

The 1857 revolt was by and large confined to the northern Indian Gangetic plain and central India.

Punjab: the Loyalty of Sikh magnates in the east of the province, which the British had assiduously cultivated of late, enabled them to contain trouble in Punjab.

Bengali Intelligentsia: the uneven spread of colonial rule ensured that the new Bengali intelligentsia was not particularly enamored of what they regarded as a movement of feudal oligarchs. So the British were really threatened in the north and in the central Indian heartland.

The aristocratic leadership behind the revolt: These kings and nobles were deeply aggrieved by British perfidy in tearing up established treaties whenever they proved inconvenient. These aristocratic leaders were offering those prepared to follow them into rebellion the legitimacy of a resurrected 18th century state system under the highest sovereignty of the Mughal emperor. The revolt of 1857 in its aristocratic, religious and agrarian aspects was also a reaction against British racial arrogance—a key feature of the mid-Victorian era.

Religious Millenarianism: was doubtless a theme which informed the revolt of 1857.

Muslim millenarianism on the forefront.

Hindu religious millenarianism did not figure in the revolt, but rebel leaders like the Rani of Jhansi and Tantia Topi have become part of the folklore and festivals of more recent times.

1857-an agrarian revolt: it is more or less clear that the agrarian revolts were multi-class in character. Taluqdar magnates, village zamindars, tenant farmers, peasant proprietors and tribal communities, all participated in one region or another.

Rebel leaders from lower to upper stratum.

It had cost an astronomical sum of 50 million pounds (Rs 500 million) to quell the mutiny-revolt of 1857. In order to restore the finances of the Indian administration, the taxation system was revamped, land revenues were moderated but an income tax was imposed for the first time on wealthier urban groups. In domain of the armed forces, upper-cast recruits from Gangetic north India were no longer deemed trustworthy. By 1875 nearly half of the British Indian army was drawn from Punjab, a fitting reward for loyalty during the crisis, and Gurkhas from Nepal now became the new shock troops for the infantry brigades.

When the mutiny broke out a mere 40,000 British soldiers had counterbalanced nearly 240,000 Indian sepoys.

Queen Victoria, in her proclamation of August 1858 taking India under the crown, made a few conciliatory gestures. Treaties with Indian princes, she assured, would be duly respected in future. Colonial subjects in general were promised a relatively benevolent government.

3.6 STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL CONTROL:

The question of how to rule the **massive population** and vast area of the colonies was of first concern to the colonialists; the search for **native collaborators** was the best solution for this concern of the colonial states. As Britain had longer, effective and more continuous colonial experience than others imperial powers, therefore I have taken British Colonialism and Colonial India as a case study in my essay. How is it possible for a so few British to hold down so many people? In this essay I will try to figure out some of the ways and strategies in which the British Colonial state sought to maintain Social Control in the Colonial India. The colonial era in India started from the conquest of Bengal by the East India Company in 1757. The far most challenge was the **consolidation of the much more diversified Indian society**, this need of controlling the diversified Indian society made the colonizers to carry out their own style on Indian government.

The company power rose from the victory of Bengal, because it had provided a secure financial base for its powerful mercenary army-the **Land Revenues of Bengal allowed the company's Indian operations against other Indian kingdoms.**

THE CREATION OF THE "BRITISH INDIA":

Cohn (1996:5) 'the British conceived of governing India by codifying and reinstating the ruling practices that had been developed by previous states and rulers. Knowledge of the history and practices of Indian states was seen as the most valuable form of

knowledge on which to build the colonial state'. The British Colonial state, with great care and consideration, **reorganized and molded the pre-colonial setup** to carry out, effectively, its colonial aims. Jalal (1998: 67) 'the early colonial edifice was undoubtedly built on the foundation of existing indigenous arrangements, institutions and identities which had not lost their vitality during the phase of political decentralization prior to colonial advance. But it is important not to lose sight of the colonial state as a key actor in bringing about major changes within economy and society.' To some modern writers (Baylay 1988:156) 'pre-colonial cast system and religious practices were fluid, eclectic and uncodified. Families could change their cast ranking in quite short periods of time. Traditional India was not a rigid society, it was British rule which made it so, codifying many localized and pragmatic customs into a unified and Brahminised Hindoo law and classing people into immutable castes through the operation of courts and ethnographical surveys'. The British brought major changes with in the economy and society of the colonial India, though the colonialists didn't create this interpretation of India, rather they speeded up and transformed social and ideological changes which were already in use. To Fuller (1989:36) "the traditional India vanished under the British Raj. I submit that what anthropologists are prone to call "traditional India is in fact, "British India".

THE JUST RULE:

Looking at the British colonization of the Indian subcontinent, an important dimension was the colonialist mentality. (Judd 1972) How did the British justify their subjugation of other peoples? Though the industrial Revolution gave the Western countries a view of their superiority, **but in addition to the technical superiority was a growing vision of**

moral superiority. The idea of the just rule, that if they were not superior, then God would not have given them the colonies'. Potter (2000) mentioned two clusters of ideas, in his book, which were central to the British colonial ideology of just rule in India, for example. One was that the **British were benevolent**, just, and gradually 'modernizing' or developing Indian economically, socially and culturally. The second cluster of ideas centered on the belief that the **colonial rulers were invincible**, it was futile to oppose them, and that Indians were too weak and disunited to oppose them successfully. These principal ideas about benevolence and invincibility were an important asset for the British in their struggle to maintain their rule.'

The British rulers assumed that Indians had lost their right to self-rule through their own weakness, which led to their subjugation by a succession of foreign rulers. And now it is the foreign rulers' responsibility for the maintenance of an equitable form of government (**Feudal not Representational**) which would benefit the ruled. And since the British had lived through feudal stage in their own history, hence theoretically the present feudal society of India could also evolve into a modern one in the distant future. For all this an Indian aristocracy had to be recognized and or created, which could play the part of loyal feudatories to the British queen. (Cohn: 166-7)

(Especially in case of Africa) Christian missionaries called for European intervention to end slavery and barbaric practices (such as human sacrifice) which provided a moral rational for European political and economic ambitions. These ambitions (**Scramble of Africa**) were officially legitimated and negotiated at the **Berlin conference of 1884-1885**, when European leaders agreed to partition the African continent into neatly bordered spheres of influence.

THE INDIRECT RULE: (in search of loyals/collaborators)

The numerical presence of the British in colonized India was never very significant. Yet, the British were able to maintain a vast and stable empire in the Indian sub-continent for almost two centuries. Although there is no doubt that physical violence (including torture) were important elements of British domination in India, equally important were the success of political strategies that took full advantage of rivalries amongst native rulers and exploited divisions arising caste, religion, class and other sectarian differences. As stated by Potter (2000:278) 'there was no way that the British could control their vast empire in India by using only the police and the army. No government lasts long on the basis of force alone. The British had to have **'traditional' authority figures** in Indian society on whom they could rely for political support and who could bring to the new state the cloak of legitimacy'.

In her article on 'colonial Africa' Elizabeth Heath explains the rationales of indirect rule by the colonial states. She argues that under direct rule, colonies were divided into districts administrated by European appointees. These appointees were responsible for regional tax collection, labor and military recruitment, public works, education, local court cases and the execution of dictates handed down from the colony's governors. They were also expected to maintain public order and discourage offensive or backward local customs. Thus direct rule was seen as a means of civilizing as well as controlling the colonies. But the **indirect rule was preferred over the direct rule** due to certain practical problems, such as, the European governments lacked the personnel needed to administer their colonies effectively, also these **few administrators** were responsible not

only for **large subject** populations, but for **vast territories**. Travel over distances was slow and arduous and **communication difficult**, as a result, colonial governors had **little contact with remote areas**. Finally, colonial **officials limited knowledge of local languages and customs**, combined with their often total of legitimacy, undermined their ability to recruit labor, collect taxes or carry out other administrative duties effectively. In the end, both the great chiefs and local village chiefs-provided indispensable to the project of colonial administration. For all these reasons, most European powers began to modify their approach to colonial rule in the early 20th century.

The great proponent of indirect rule- Lord Lugard, in his book, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922), advised the British administrators that **White officials were to be more advisors than direct governors**. He recommends **preservation as much as possible**; change should take place by evolutionary processes which would allow adaptations to take place while maintaining a good deal of continuity-no sharp breaks with the past. But Lugard's idea of indirect rule was not a static one. He believed in changing and adapting-modernizing, and hoped to do this using traditional chiefs and princes.

The **assistance of anthropologists and missionaries**, in this process of colonial administration, cannot be ignored. But with whom the colonialists had trouble or dissatisfaction, were replaced with other considered more loyal. In Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) in 1927, the British administration abolished hereditary rights of succession and assumed the power to appoint chiefs, thereby minimizing the chances of chiefly disobedience.

In British India, those territories or princely states which were outside the direct administration of the British were entered into treaty arrangements, who acknowledge British over lordship in return for a measure of autonomy in their respective domains. This colonial construct of indirect rule as stated by Jalal (1998:69) was an ingenious device that complemented and did not contradict the efficacy of direct British colonial rule in other parts of the sub-continent. Power may have been exercised through indirect means, but it was not in any more than a formal sense limited in its potential to stamp out resistance.

REWARD OR RIGHT:

As stated earlier that the administration of the British colonies was generally guided by the principle of indirect rule. This indirect rule as we know was made possible with the help of the native Indian collaborators or loyalists. The feeling of loyalty rooted amongst section of the Indian elite and the princes, was the main political force in the British India operated by the British. To intact this feeling of loyalty, rewards were presented to these collaborators for their services and allegiance to the British Raj. Cohn(1983:169) ‘the offering of these rewards and honors (**Nazar and Peshkash**) were seen as paying for the favor, which the British then **translated into ‘rights’ relating to their trading activities’**.

REVENUE COLLECTION:

The chief concern of the military and bureaucratic institutions of the Colonial British State was the security and stability of land revenue-the principle source of its income. A variety of mechanisms were created in different parts of India to generate revenue

without revolt. Different revenue systems were applied in different areas, according to the need, for example, in Bengal the Zamindari system (fixed taxes in perpetuity in return for ownership of large states) was established, however, in Madras and Bombay the Ryotwari (peasant) settlement system was set in motion, in which peasant cultivators had to pay annual taxes directly to the government. Jalal (1998:70) 'in the early nineteenth century the colonial state armed the Zamindars with formidable powers of extra-economic coercion, including distraint and eviction. The entire period from the late eighteenth century to the mid nineteenth century was characterized by revenue and rent offensive by the colonial state and its Zamindari intermediaries.'

OFFICIALIZING:

British made visible their power by "officializing" procedure that established and extended their capacity in many areas. They took control by defining and classifying space, making separations between public and private spheres; by counting and classifying their populations, replacing religious institutions as the registrar of births, marriages, and deaths, and by standardizing language and scripts. The state licensed some activities as legitimate and suppressed others as immoral or unlawful. The schools became the crucial civilizing institutions and sought to produce moral and productive citizens. (Cohn 1996:3)

ENGLISH JUDICIAL SYSTEM:

The legal system that accompanied British colonialism is characterized by a mixture of different laws related to the principle of indirect rule (Mathieu, 1994). The customary laws of the colonies were only accepted on the conditions that it did not conflict with the basic principles of British laws, which were in any case considered superior on a presumed evolutionary scale of legitimate legality.

In 1772 an elaborate judicial system, known as Adalat, established civil and criminal jurisdictions, both Hindu Pundits and Muslim Qazis were recruited to aid the presiding judges in interpreting their customary laws, but in other instances, British common and statutory laws became applicable. In extraordinary situations where none of these systems was applicable, the judges were enjoined to adjudicate on the basis of justice, equity and good conscience. Jalal (1998:73) 'the introduction of English judiciary was the most important policy for upholding their power; it was to mask their essentially amoral political behavior that the British retained some of the colonial trappings of pre-colonial state ideology. The East India Company's officials consulted Mughal law officers-Qzis, Muftis and Pundits, all this pragmatic policy for a newly colonizing power was explicitly aimed at minimizing the threats of social reaction'. According to Dirks (2001) it was in fact the British law mostly responsible for regulating the colonial Indian society.

EDUCATION POLICY:

The education policy introduced by the colonialists was intended to reinforce existing lines of socio-economic division in society rather than bringing general liberation from ignorance and superstitions. While the strategy of divide and rule was used most effectively, an important aspect of British rule in India was to groom and **artfully**

tutored the elites into becoming model British subjects. In 1835, Thomas Macaulay articulated the goals of British colonial imperialism most succinctly “we must do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern, a class of persons Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in words and intellect.”

CASTE SYSTEM:

Is India's caste system the remnant of ancient India's social practices or the result of the historical relationship between India and British colonial rule? Dirks (2001) elects to support the latter view. Adhering to the school of Orientalist thought promulgated by Edward Said and Bernard Cohn, Dirks argues that British colonial control of India for 200 years pivoted on its manipulation of the caste system. He hypothesizes that caste was used to organize India's diverse social groups for the benefit of British control. Bayly (1988:157) argues that in early nineteenth century, however, the spirit of hierarchy and rituals distinction became more pervasive. The British peace speeded the rise of high Hindu kingship, Brahmanism and the advance of principles of purity and pollution in the countryside. Cohn's (1983) work in particular, provided a new understanding to India's caste system. His work revealed that although the caste system had existed in India before the British took control, the system took on a new meaning when the British established laws to codify it. Cohn argued that the **British imagined India as a very hierarchical society and used laws and rituals to control the country that made it more hierarchical.**

POLICING:

After the territorial boundaries of the colonial regime were secured, a period of control was set in. The emphasis of colonial rule now switched from military security to the formation of a colonial police force for civil duties. (As in most of Africa) Armed with rifles, the central function of the police force was to collect hut taxes and obtain labor for employment in the European estates. The army troops were gradually reduced and matters of internal security given prominence since it was thought that the African population would no longer resist British rule. The emphasis on coercive control generally declined in favor of closer collaborations with the local chiefs and princes. Most police work, nonetheless, was not so much involved with the prevention and detection of crime, but focused on the economic foundations of colonial power. During the Second World War, the police was still of relatively small size and had little influence in the rural areas which were by and large unexplored. While the police gradually engaged more in the enforcement of various criminal laws, its economic functions remained crucial. Police agents also functioned as prison wards for natives that could not pay taxes, or they kept women hostage to force their husbands to pay. In addition, the police protected European property in the towns and tried to enforce laws against liquor-distilling and native witchcraft movements. Most other police activities during the war were military and political. For instance, enemy aliens were arrested and detained by agents of the newly created Political Intelligence Bureau (Mathieu Deflem: 1994). As pointed out by (Deflem: 1994) that the 'British colonial administration based on the imperial notion of martial race adopted the strategy of multi-ethnic recruitment. The British belief, those members of the native population could provide a necessary link with

the British rulers to increase the efficiency of police work. Therefore, it was carefully arranged that native policemen did not serve in their own region of origin or residence, which was considered too dangerous, but were to police other regions of the conquered colony'. In case of British India, the British Indian Army (Jalal: 1998:98) "was organized and mixed the regiments in such a way that, as the secretary of state put it in 1862; 'Sikhs might fire into Hindu, Gurkha into either, without any scruple in case of need'. As justification for the new recruitment patterns, the colonial masters devised a new-fangled, **anthropological theory of martial races and castes**".

ENDING REMARKS:

These were some of the ways in which the British colonial state sought to maintain social control in its colonies. The imperial powers paid little heed to native culture or political units, as a consequence, the social map was changed beyond recognition, **African and Asians state boundaries were frequently divided into ethno-linguistic, racial and religious groups**. Economic infrastructure and production patterns were shaped by the interests and needs of the colonial powers (Professor Gerhard Rampel). The persistence poverty and backwardness of the Third World is still blamed to colonialism. David Potter (2000) 'Political sovereignty did not necessarily bring with it economic independence. This led some to question whether formal independence was indeed nothing more than a formality. Certainly the colonial experience resulted in ties with world economic order that long outlived independence. Neocolonialism, as these inequitable ties became known, cannot be discounted. As stated by Talbot (2000:10) The British were always pragmatic rulers, more preoccupied with law and order than with developmentalist concerns. Talbot (2000:13) Ever since the publication in 1978 of

Edward Said's seminal study 'Orientalism'. Some scholars have recognized that European orientalist knowledge, classification, definition and representation of non-western societies were more about the power to control than about intellectual curiosity. Writers as Stocking (1991) have revealed how ethnography and philology were tools of colonialism.

Module 4: Partition of India

4.1. Indian Reformist Movements (Ram Mohan Roy & Sir Syed Ahmed Khan)

Post 1857 India: A more stable British government.

Emerging Political Formations [e.g. Indian National Congress (1885) All India Muslim League (1906)]

Various regional, caste based, religious organizations, literary guilds, social service leagues, bar associations and educational societies.

Muslims were perceived as a significant and separate political community.

Emergence of 'Salaried' class: Expansion of educational opportunities (in the presidency areas (Bombay, Madras and Calcutta) produced a class of Indian professionals of lawyers, doctors, civil servants, teachers, journalists and businessmen who got involved in local government in different provinces.

Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1883)

He is considered to be the **first Indian reformist**

A Hindu Monotheist, a Unitarian (his writings sparked interests among British and American Unitarians).

His study of different religions convinced him that since every religion had the same end, namely, the moral regeneration of mankind, each stood in need of reinterpretation and reassessment in changing circumstances of the time. Therefore, he thought there was no reason for him to give up Hinduism and accept any other religion. He would accept the universal moral teachings of every religion but without its dogma, ritual and superstition. He knew Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit. He had read Quran and discovered monotheism. His monotheism was reinforced by the teaching of the Vedas. And called for the Hindus to revert to the true teachings of the Vedas (the Upanishad)

Rejected sacrifice (ritual killings). He stated that the best means of achieving bliss was through pure spiritual contemplation (mediation) on and worship of the Supreme Being, and that sacrificial rites were intended only for persons of less subtle intellect

Founder of the Brahmo Samaj 1828 (society of God) one of the first Indian socio-religious reform movements.

He is best known for his efforts to **abolish Satti**, he discouraged **polygamy** (but only under specific circumstances), condemned **idolatry** and asked for the rights for **widows to remarry** and the rights for **women to hold property**. Emphasized the importance of **education to women**.

Bengal Renaissance

This Movement questioned existing orthodoxies, particularly with respect to women, marriage, the dowry, the cast system and religion.

Many of the leaders of Bengal Renaissance was in Brahmo Samaj and followers of Roy.

To him English education was superior to the traditional Indian education system.

He sought to integrate western culture with the best feature of his own country's traditions

Hindu Revivalist Movements

Hindu revivalist Movements... perhaps more anti Muslim than anti British. E.g: Swami Vivekanand (1863-1902) Militant nationalism in religious terms.

The Arya Samaj –a reformist Movement which was less violent in its nature started in 1877

Chatterjee's Anandamath (the Abbey of Bliss) an anti-Muslim novel which incites the Hindu against the Muslims and to work for the revival of Hinduism. It was in this novel that the famous song 'Bande Mataram (hail mother) appeared.

Another Hindu movement which advocated militancy is that of Tilak. Tilak believed in killing one's enemy by deception. His men were engaged in killing British officers. The movement took a clear anti-Muslim turn and was run and organized on Hindu lines

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) Long before the Mutiny the Mogul Princes had abdicated their political leadership to religious leaders. E.g. Syed Ahmad Berelawi, Shah Abdul Aziz, Faraiziyah Movement, Militant Movements

A Muslim reformist and an educationist.

A great admirer of western civilization and education.

Founder of Aligargh Movement.

He called for Muslims to shun the politics of agitation

Wanted to make understanding and trust between British and Muslims.

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In 1863 he founded 'Aligarh Scientific Society'. It was based on the doctrine that Islam and Western rationalism were not incompatible.

His greatest achievement was the establishment of the Mohammedan Anglo- Oriental College in 1875, modeled on Oxford and Cambridge which later on became 'Aligargh Muslim University.

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College in 1875. He was a great scholar of Arabic, Persian, and English. He emphasized the validity of free inquiry (*ijtihad*) and the alleged similarities between Quran and the laws of nature discovered by modern science.

He encouraged the Muslims to profess their loyalty towards the British and opposed those who wanted to join the Indian National congress. He was the first leader to talk about the separate representation for the Muslims.

Sir Syed's views (a quote from his speech in 1888), “ Now, suppose that all the English and the whole English army were to leave India, taking with them all their canon and their splendid weapons and everything, then who would be rulers of India? Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations- the Muhammadans and the Hindus- could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power. Most certainly not”.

FORMATION OF NATIONAL MOVEMENTS

Indian national congress and its early phase from 1885-1905 the Indian national congress was first political association which claimed to represent all Indians was formed in 1885.

Indians learnt their positive national consciousness lesson from the British examples of political consolidation, technological integration, administrative unity and the sublimation of personal interest and identity to the impersonal laws and “higher” needs of national purpose.

In 1885, seventy five men came together to represent all provinces of India and formed an association under the guidance Allan Octavian Hume and the first session was held in Bombay in December 1885.

The principal demand of the Congress were:

Extension of Indian representation in the Legislative councils

Give Indian greater powers to discuss budgets

Indianization of Indian Civil Services by holding examinations in India.

Higher jobs in army for the Indians and demand for racial equality.

Inquiry into the endemic poverty and famines in India by elaborating the Drain of wealth theory.

The leaders of the congress were mostly English educated and believed in the good government created by the British in India.

Politics for these early leaders was very much a part time affair and they did not represent the public opinion (if there was any) at all. According to United Province Lt. Governor Auckland Colvin called the congress “microscopic minority” and tried to obstruct the congress session in Allahabad in 1888.

Communalism

A modern phenomenon-a colonial legacy

In its common Indian usage, communalism refers to the condition of suspicion, fear and hostility between members of different religious communities.

In academic investigations the term is applied to organized political movements based on the proclaimed interests of a religious community.

For Bipan Chandra, the important Marxist historian of India, communalism was the belief that ‘because people have the same religion, they also have common social, political, and economic interests’.

‘A more than common preoccupation with their distinctive religious identity has been a feature shared by upper and middle class Muslims in the subcontinent, irrespective of their 'liberal', 'modernist', 'conservative' or 'anti-modernist' leanings’ (Jalal, 1999).

Colonial officials used it to refer to fundamental irrationality and religious bigotry that they perceived in India. To them communalism was like tribalism or factionalism, that

emerges spontaneously and even primordially in the midst of self-identifying communities

Religious symbols were first used by Tilak.

Religious, caste, language, and racial stereotypes crystallized in the late nineteenth century

These were often direct off-shoots of colonial attempts to describe and understand the bewildering diversity of social stratification and networks in India

Censuses, ethnological surveys, cartography (map making), and various cameral sciences provided technologies of classification and reification (materialize) that were used by the colonial government

The phrase *umma wahida* in the Qur'an (the "One Community") refers to all of the Islamic world unified. On the other hand, in Arabic *umma* can also be used in the more Western sense of nation, example: *al-Umam al-Muttahida*, the United Nations.

The Constitution of Medina, an early document said to have been negotiated by Muhammad (pbuh) in AD 622 with the leading clans of Medina, explicitly refers to Jewish and pagan citizens of Medina as members of the Umma

Islamic Umma" or "Muslim Umma" to refer to *all* the people in the lands and countries where Muslims predominantly reside, and which were once under the control of the Islamic Caliphate. They thus include non-Muslim minorities as members of the *umma*.

When they talk of unifying the "Islamic Umma" they would include these non-Muslims, as citizens of the Islamic Umma, living peacefully with their own respective religions, subject to certain specific conditions

4.2. POST 1857 INDIA

Post-1857 India (political democratization introduced by British in post-1857 India threatened Muslims throughout British India, especially the Muslims of the United Provinces (UP)

According to one source, in 1886 the Muslims, who constituted 13.4 % of the population of the area, nevertheless occupied 45% of the administrative positions (Jaffrelot, 2002)

Muslims of the United Provinces (UP) [aristocratic inheritors of the Mughal Empire]

In 1871, in Bengal, of the 773 Indians holding responsible government jobs, the Muslims, even though their numbers were approximately equals to Hindus in the province, occupied only 92 positions as compared with 681 held by the Hindus.

ALL INDIA MUSALIM LEAGUE (AIML): The Beginning of Communal Politics.

Muslims demand for separate electorates.

Muslim Majority and Muslim Minority Provinces.

1906: Muslim notables or feudals', predominately the elites of the United Provinces, established AIML.

1937: Provincial elections, Muslim League was defeated poorly in Muslim-majority provinces.

AIML won just one seat in Punjab and was empty handed in both Sind and Frontier Province. It was only in Bengal that Muslim League put up a respectable performance, capturing 37 out of the 119 seats reserved for Muslims. Overall the Muslim League collected no more than 5% of the Muslim vote.

‘Muslim Nationalism was its weakest in the Muslim majority provinces’ (Alavi, 1988, p. 67).

Muslims who were against the idea of Pakistan (Jamiyyat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, Abul Kalam Azad, the Unionists of Punjab and Sind, the Pushtoon nationalist of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and some Muslim Bengali nationalists (Krishak Praja Party) Secular politics of the subcontinent (Congress, the Unionists of Punjab and Sind, the Ahrars and Khaksar of Punjab, the Khudai Khidmatgar of North West Frontier Province and the Bengali nationalists were all secular in nature and of course hostile to the Pakistan movement)

Muslim League leaders (mostly secular)

POST 1937 ELECTIONS STRATEGY OF AIML

ML labeling Pakistan Movement as an Islamic Movement (‘Islam in Danger’ and ‘Hindu Congress’)

Targeting Muslim Majority Provinces

Punjab which held the key to the credibility of the Pakistan demand was targeted.

propaganda campaign against the Punjab’s Unionist Party.

Sind (the Sufis (Pirs) played an important role in Sind in popularizing the Pakistan cause (Ansari, 1992 cited in Talbot, 2002, p. 146).

North West Frontier Province [‘Khudai Khidmatgars’ (Servants of God)]

Non-religious Movements were countered through local Pirs.

1946 Elections (Muslim League secured 75 per cent of the total Muslim vote in comparison with 4.4 per cent in 1937)

4.3. THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN

Its victory in the 1946 elections enabled the Muslim League to demand a separate state on behalf of the Muslims of India, but the idea of Pakistan was still not clear.

Jinnah as hailed by Sarojini Naidu as the 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity', having support of Muslim majority provinces was still struggling for grouping of Muslim majority provinces which could have enjoyed a degree of regional autonomy, possibly within an overall Indian Federal Union rather than Partitioning India.

In mid 1930s Muslim students visited Jinnah in London with their Pakistan scheme. Jinnah replied 'stay away, before I think of you as stooges of British imperialism'.

My father never wanted separation. Dina

Jinnah's Idea of open border and common defense of the sub-continent.

The revisionist school of modern South Asian historiography

CABINET MISSION PLAN 1946: CABINET MISSION PLAN (three-tiered all India federation)

Jinnah interpreted the scheme to be a defacto recognition of his Pakistan Demand: the groups would have constituent assemblies of their own; the constitution of the federal central could eventually be designed to be a mere agency with executive and not legislative powers. The Congress also was amenable to the scheme.

But Congress argued that the provinces were free to opt out of a group to which they did not wish to belong. Congress had a ministry in northwestern province which was in Group B and under the Congress reading it should have a choice to opt out.

The plan provided only the choice between an undivided India with a weak federal structure with compulsory grouping of Muslim and Hindu majority provinces, or a

separate independent sovereign centre, that would constitute only of the Muslim majority districts of Bengal and Punjab.

Jinnah accepted, Nehru rejected.

The idea of partition of India was neither based on the Indian nationalists' view-that partition was the British imperialist policy of divide and rule nor, what most Pakistani historians declare that it was motivated by Islamic ideology and was based on Two Nation Theory.

'Pakistan movement was a movement of Muslims rather than of Islam' (Alavi)

To the revisionist school 'the partition of 1947 was no more than a partial solution to the Muslims minority problem in the subcontinent'

Jinnah the sole spokesman (a grand strategist)

Pakistan Resolution (March 1940, the gist of that resolution was the acceptance of Muslims as a nation and not a minority, as had been presumed in the past)

What Jinnah really aiming for was a grouping of Muslim majority provinces enjoying a degree of regional autonomy, possibly within an overall Indian federal union rather than the partition of India; especially if that was to entail carving up Punjab and Bengal (Bose & Jalal, 2002)

Jinnah had always kept the demand for Pakistan vague, mainly as a bargaining chip to negotiate with Congress to have equal rights to Muslims at the all-India level.

In 1946 communal violence erupted

partition of Punjab and Bengal

Congress (Nehru and Petal) was ready for partitioning Bengal and Punjab, at the price of taking power from the British at the centre.

British hasty withdrawal.

Congress demand of partitioning Bengal and Punjab.

Jinnah was quite happy to accept Pakistan as a regional grouping within an Indian federal union. It is testified by his ready acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan, which was offered in April 1946

‘little India’. (Tariq Ali)

According to the revisionist school it was the contradictions and structural peculiarities of Indian society and politics in late colonial India which eventually led to the creation of Pakistan.

The main actors of the Pakistan Movement; **Jinnah**, AIML, Salariat

Conclusion

Jinnah was never in favour of a mutilated and crippled Pakistan with a divided Punjab and Bengal (Bose & Jalal, 2002), it seems that he was forced by different factors to accept the 3rd June partition plan. ‘Jinnah’s fears of his own followers, his deep mistrust of the Congress high command, and Mountbatten’s decision to move up the date for the final transfer of power from June 1948 to August 1947 left him with little alternative but to acquiesce in the creation of a Pakistan shorn of eastern Punjab and western Bengal (including Calcutta)-the ‘maimed, mutilate and moth-eaten’ state which he had rejected out of hand in 1944 and then in 1946’(Bose and Jalal, 2002, p. 187).

Horrors of Partition; 12 to 14 million people were caught up in the process of mass migration; over one million were killed in violent encounters, and an estimated 75,000 women were abducted and subjected to sexual violence.

"ghost trains"

15 million refugees

Division of the provinces of Punjab and Bengal,

Ruined economies and lands; no established, experienced system of government.

Separation of Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971.

Wars between India and Pakistan; deadlocked over Kashmir.

Module 5: AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY

5.1. COLONIAL LEGACY IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Among the more fascinating themes in contemporary South Asia has been the ‘success’ of democracy in India and its ‘failure’ in neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh. **That’s why a common British colonial legacy led to apparently contrasting patterns of political development in post-independence South Asian.**

Secular India and Islamic Pakistan: **in the initial decades of independence, the Congress-dominated Indian centre wedded to an ideology of secular nationalism did better than Islamic Pakistan in containing the forces of regionalism. It might be tempting to attribute Congress’s achievements in establishing a relatively stable democratic system in India to its ideology of secular nationalism and commitment to centralism. After all, the deployment of Islam as the central tenet of Pakistani nationalism managed to neither curb the forces of regionalism nor piece together the most rudimentary form of a democratic political system.**

The transition from colonialism was almost as difficult for India as it was for the newly created state of Pakistan. With partition India lost some of its agricultural tracts and the sources of raw material for its industries, especially jute and cotton. The division of assets deprived India of civil and military personnel, as well as of financial resources, complicating the task of resettlement of the millions fleeing East and West Pakistan. Yet India inherited the colonial state’s central government

apparatus and an industrial infrastructure which, for all its weaknesses, was better developed than in the areas constituting Pakistan. The post-independence adaptations of the colonial concept of the center, both in its institutional and ideological manifestations, is the strongest cement in a comparative analysis of how processes of state construction in India and Pakistan aided the functioning of parliamentary democracy in one and its abortion in the other.

COLONIAL LEGACY IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Few political decisions in the 20th century have altered the course of history in more dramatic fashion than the partition of India in 1947. Economic and social linkages which over the millennia had survived periods of imperial consolidation, crises and collapse to weld the peoples of the subcontinent into a loosely layered framework of interdependence were rudely severed (cut off). The political differences among Indians over the power sharing once independence had been won sheared apart the closely woven threads of a colonial administrative structure that institutionally integrated, if never quite unified, the subcontinent.

Geographical and Political Unity: Even in periods of imperial consolidation empire-builders generally aspired to a loose form of hegemony over diverse and autonomous constituent units. An overarching geographical identity of pre-colonial India contrasted sharply with a political unity that had constantly to be negotiated and renegotiated between diverse peoples inhabiting the domains of sovereign or quasi-sovereign regional rulers. What made the colonial period unlike any other in

history was the British attempt to turn the bare facts of geographical India, variously and imaginatively construed, into defining principles for a centralized political unity based on the notion of a singular and indivisible sovereignty.

Impersonalized Colonial Rule: To the extent that the British effort to stretch the ambit of imperial control through rule-bound institutions based on Western concepts of contractual law and impersonalized sovereignty rather than on the personal patronage of rulers was without historical precedence in the subcontinent, so too were the consequences. A political unity conceived and constructed in cold-blooded fashion and frozen in the impersonal rationality of bureaucratic institutions could neither reflect, not capture, the internal dynamics of a society accustomed to direct, personalized rule.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PARTITION: Bringing political India into conformity with geographical India proceeded directly from British perceptions of imperial requirements, both strategic and economic. By contrast with the loosely woven web of suzerainty claimed by pre-colonial empires, the British established an essentially unitary state structure in colonial India. This required a skilful manipulation of centralism and regionalism on the one hand, and between all-India nationalism and communalism on the other.

British India relied on the trappings of bureaucratic authoritarianism and collaborative networks of local rural intermediaries to balance and cancel out pressures emanating from below.

By granting local representation the British diverted the attention of the masses towards the provinces, thus keeping the unitary center firmly in their hands.

A series of constitutional reforms in the early 20th century, aimed at broadening the colonial state's social bases of support, conceded the principle of elective representation, but only by diverting Indian political attentions towards safe local and provincial pastures and keeping the unitary centre firmly in British hands. (e.g Morley-Minto reforms)

The politics of Muslims were bounded more by locality and province than by the specifically communal concerns of the tiny elite directing the ML.

Despite a narrow base of support in the Muslim-majority provinces, the AIML used the fact of Muslim being a separate political category, thus challenging the Congress's claim to represent the whole of India and, therefore, its right to seize power at the center. Jinnah found it convenient to reinstate the distinction between geographical and political unity which had been dropped from the lexicons of colonialists and nationalists alike.

Jinnah's point of view: there was force in Jinnah's contention that India was a geographic and, at best, an administrative rather than a political entity. Indian political unity, Jinnah maintained, could not be decreed (enacted, passed) and enforced by the unitary and centralized administrative structures of the colonial state.

Congress rejects Jinnah's point of view: such an idea of sovereignty was at fundamental variance with congress's notion of an indivisible and non-negotiable sovereignty for independent India.

Jinnah's argument for keeping Indian geography and politics on separate but parallel tracks: this would give ML the leverage it needed to negotiate constitutional safeguards for Muslims minorities in the rest of India in exchange for those non-Muslim populations residing within the territories of the Muslim state. Unfortunately for Jinnah and the ML, the contradictory constraints imposed by the colonial political system on Muslim politics, namely the emphasis on provincial and local arenas of politics on the one hand and communally compartmentalized electorates on the other, worked to thwart the broader objectives for which the demand for Pakistan had been raised. If the demand was to have the support to Indian Muslims, in majority as well as minority provinces, it had to appear to offer something to all Muslims. It could do so only if it was framed in communal terms. Yet the politics of Muslims at the regional level did not pour neatly into communal moulds. The affinities of regional geography were not always consistent with the emotions and aspirations elicited (drawn out) by the ideal of a united all-India Muslims politics.

The Muslim-majority provinces lent support to the ML in the hope of negotiating a constitutional arrangement based on strong provinces and a weak centre. This is why the Pakistan resolution of March 1940 had spoken of 'Independent Muslim

states' in which the constituent units would be 'autonomous and sovereign'. The cabinet mission plan of 1946 came close to giving Jinnah what he needed by proposing the grouping of Muslim and Hindu provinces at the second tier while restricting the federal centre to only three subjects-defense, foreign affairs and communication.

But the shared sovereignty between Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority was unacceptable to a Congress advocating a composite nationalism based on an indivisible sovereign central authority.

Inheriting the strong central apparatus of the colonial state was Congress' best insurance of quelling movements for autonomy in the Hindu-majority provinces and bringing the princely states firmly into the Indian Union. So Congress found it politically expedient to abandon its commitment to India's geographical integrity and allow the division of the subcontinent along ostensibly communal lines rather than weaken the impersonalized institutional structures of the colonial state to accommodate the powerful regionally based aspirations of the Muslim provinces.

It is true that unlike its counterpart the AIML, which had practically no organizational presence in the Muslim majority provinces, the INC had made an impact on the local structure of political in the Hindu-majority provinces. While the prolonged suspension of political processes in Pakistan had resulted in an obsessive concern with the two main non-elected institutions of the state, the civil bureaucracy and the military, the

formalization of democracy in India had fixated attention on the fortunes of a single political party.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGACY:

The different colonial legacy inheritances of a central state apparatus, the relatively milder impact of the strategic and economic consequences of partition on India than on Pakistan and the nature of their international links were the most important factors leading to alternative outcomes in the two countries. 1951. LAK's assassination and Nehru's elections victory.

India inherited the colonial state's unitary central administration; Pakistan had to construct an entirely new central government administration. India relatively had smoother transition from colonialism. On the contrary Pakistan lacked competent personnel. Both the nascent countries had to rely on the bureaucratic authoritarianism inherent in the colonial state structure remained largely intact. It proved difficult at the very onset to establish the principle of legislative supremacy over the executive.

Alliance of convenience with the non-elected representatives: the co-existence of formal democracy with bureaucratic authoritarianism has been one of the more enduring legacies of colonial rule in the subcontinent.

Although local bureaucrats were theoretically in a subordinate position to the elected representatives; they remained by virtue of their proximity and accessibility for all practical purposes the main representatives of the common people.

Unfamiliarity with the working of both political and administrative institutions of the state was another reason...politicians dependent on the local bureaucrats.

Both states (India and Pakistan) went through a greater measure of administrative centralization than undivided India, the absence of a central state apparatus gave added impetus to that process in Pakistan. Given the weaknesses of the ML's organizational machinery in the Muslim-majority provinces and the relative strengths of the Congress organization in the Indian provinces, the Pakistani political leadership had to concede much greater autonomy to the administrative bureaucracy in order to consolidate state authority than its opposite number in India.

The co-existence of formal democracy with bureaucratic authoritarianism has been one of the more enduring legacies of colonial rule in the subcontinent.

THE ECONOMICS OF PARTITION:

Quite apart from the need to impose central authority, the expansion and centralization of the administrative machinery in Pakistan was needed to augment meager state resources and finance the requirements of the defense establishment. Already in the initial year of independence Pakistan's defense expenditure was higher than that of the undivided government of India.

Very soon after partition the Pakistani provinces were hustled into relinquishing their right to a whole range of taxes by the central government in the interest of establishing the financial stability of the new state.

A nascent state with weak industrial base and defense problem: Pakistan had to solicit (plead for something) foreign aid and, in this way, increase its dependence on the centers of the international Capitalist system.

The Ideological dimension:

‘The secularism of the congress and the communalism of the ML are the main ideological legacies of the colonial era in India and Pakistan. Both creeds were formulated as a response to colonialism in a bid to win the allegiance of large segments of Indian society. Instead of representing two sharply divergent or mutually exclusive world views, secularism and communalism in the subcontinent context in fact reveal themselves as alternative strategies of political mobilization. As such they appear less as polar opposites than competing and interacting political forces (contradictions between the rhetoric and reality of Congress’s secularism and League’s religious communalism)

THE OBJECTIVE OF PARTITION RESTS WITH CONTORTED (TWISTED) ENDS.

What is more, congress’s acceptance of Partition along communal lines for the sake of a strong centralized state power was a complete reversal of its policy of acquiring power over a secular and united India. And as for the ML which at least had been consistently confused ideologically, the goal of Pakistan was attained by dividing the very Muslim community whose interests it supposedly wanted to represent and safeguard.

If Partition deflected, even distorted, the ideological positions of the congress and the ML, the institutional, strategic and economic legacies of colonialism contorted (twisted) many of the objectives for which Independence had been won. The commitment to

democracy was compromised by the attractions of governance through the bureaucratic instruments of the state. A communal holocaust following partition and the onset of military hostilities between India and Pakistan made a mockery of Gandhian notions of non-violence. The assumption of the centralized power of the raj by the representing the interest of specific privileged groups postponed the goals of socio-economic reform aimed at eliminating poverty, discrimination and exploitation. In Pakistan, the unifying bonds of Islam could not prevent the imperatives of constructing a central apparatus and raising a viable shield of defense against India from exacerbating the sense of alienation and socio-economic deprivation in the various regions.

So the dominant idioms of nationalism, secularism and communalism of the late colonial era left rather contradictory and confusion legacies. It was the Western colonial ideology of an indivisible sovereignty as underwritten by a centralized state structure that held the more unambiguous attraction for the managers of the subcontinent's post-colonial states.

Module 6: RELIGION'S INFLUENCE IN SOUTH ASIA:

6.1. JIHAD

TERMINOLOGIES:

SUNNAH: Practices done or recommended by the Prophet.

HADITH: Reports on the saying and the traditions of Prophet Muhammad or What he witnessed and approved are called Hadith.

SHARIAH: The Shariah is the revealed and the authoritative laws of the religion of Islam. The legislative power in the gov't lies in the hand of legislative assembly. The legislators are to make rules and regulations within the scope and dimensions of the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet. These rules constitute the Shariah

Jihad instrument of Mullah power, slaughter in the name of Jihad.

The Misunderstood Doctrine of **Jihad**

Definition: Arabic word means “ to struggle” or “to strive”

The word Jihad implies more than ‘Holy War’. It signifies a physical, moral, spiritual and intellectual effort.

The word used for war in Quran is ‘Jihad’ and ‘Qital’.

It often comes with other Quranic concepts such as Faith, Repentance, Righteous deeds and Migration.

OTHER EXAMPLES OF JIHAD

Speaking out against an oppressive ruler. (Sunan Abu Dawood, book 37, No 4330 and Tirmidhi, Kitabu'l-Fitan)

Going to Hajj----for women. (Sahih Bukhari, Volume 2, book 26, No:595)

Taking care of elderly parents. (Sahih Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawood, Tirmidhi and Nasai)

ANTI-COLONIAL MUSLIM (MILITARY) MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA

Traditionalists:

....they believed in militant movements—that could defeat British Raj through force.

Shaheedain Movement (1831).

War of independence (1857).

Deoband Madrasa.

Military-religio Movements.

Liberals:

Western educated.

Believed in the constitutional and political struggle

Non-violence.

Aligargh Movement.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.(1817-1898)

.....he argued that jihad meant only defensive war and could not justify further resistance to British rule as long as the British did not actively interfere with the practice of Islam.

Moderators:

synthesis of the liberals and traditionalists.

Religion-intellectual Movement.

Nadwat-ul- Ulema.

War through media.

Abu-al-Ala Mawdudi: (1903-79)

.....a Pakistani thinker, was the first Islamic writer to approach Jihad systematically.

Jihad as war of liberation.

Secular and nationalists interpretation of jihad.

Jumat Islami (Pakistan)

Akwan-ul-Muslimeen (Egypt)

.....Mawdudi and Hasan al Bana breathed new life into the concept of jihad as holy war to end the foreign occupation of Muslim lands.

AFGHAN WAR: (1979)

An event of a cold war.

A defence war.

Backed by U.S, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Victory against a super power.

Traditionalists back in the limelight.

Culture of jihad

Taliban: (1992)

The 1st govt established by the traditionalists.

Afghanistan—strategic depth against India.

The doctrine of jihad

Sources of Islamic shariah (Law)

Quran.

Sunnah.

The purpose of jihad:

Fight against persecution.

.....persecution is worse than killing (2:191)

And fight them on until there is no more persecution, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah altogether.(8:39)

Condition for jihad

There is no jihad without an organised Muslim state.

Balance of power of a Muslim state with its adversary should be 1:2 (8:65,66)

No violation of any treaties.(Quran 8:72)

(...but if they seek your aid in religion, it is your duty to help them, except against a people with whom you have a treaty of mutual alliance. And (remember) Allah sees all that you do.)

Open declaration of war. (8:58)

Must not target non-combatant citizens. (Quran 2:190)

(...you may fight in the cause of God against those who attack you, but do not aggress.

God does not love the aggressor.

Allegiance to the state

Amruhum shura Baynahum (42:38)

Allegiance to that govt is a religious obligation on the Muslim citizens of that state. (4:59).

...obey Allah and the Prophet and those who are in authority among you. Then if there is difference of opinion among you, refer it back to Allah and the Prophet.(4:59)

Conditions for rebellion/military struggle/jihad.

Rebellion against the state (khuruj) is allowed. only...

If the rulers unequivocally deny Islam.(*Muslim, Kitabu'l-Imarah*)

If the govt is a dictatorship.

If the leader of khuruj (rebellion) is one who, without any doubt has the support of the majority of the nation.

All these conditions are essential in that even if one of them is missing, *Khuruj* is not permissible

ENDING REMARKS:

Taking the law into one's own hands amounts to either fasad(creating disorder or terrorism) or Maharabah (rebellion). both of which are punishable by death in Islam.

In Islam, there is no concept of Jihad(Qital-that is militant struggle in the way of Allah) or the implementation of punishment without the authority of the state.

Quran says...at whoever took a life, unless it be for murder or for spreading disorder on earth, it would be as if he killed all the mankind, and whoever saved a life, it would be as if he saved all mankind..(5:32)

Why is someone, who believes in this book commits murder?

6.2 RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM IN PAKISTAN

There is a very common misbelieve that Pakistan was founded, like Israel, to fulfill a religious ideal, to create an Islamic state and Islamic society for the Muslims of India, where they can practice Islam freely. The regime of general Zial-ul-Haq had declared likewise that Pakistan was created on the basis of Islam; he stated (Tariq Ali 2002:156) 'Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out Judaism from Israel and it will collapse like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular, it would collapse'. (Alavi 1986:21) 'Lacking a popular mandate, the military regime had sought its claim to legitimacy, if not its purpose, in divine ordinance'.

(Alavi, 1986:21) 'The irony of the argument that Pakistan was founded on religious ideology lies in the fact that practically every Muslim group and organization in the Indian subcontinent that was, specifically, religious-Islamic was hostile to Jinnah and the Muslim League, and strongly opposed the Pakistan Movement. The fact remains that Islam was not at the centre of Muslim nationalism in India, but was brought into the political debate in Pakistan after the nation was created. The Pakistan Movement was not a movement of Islam, but of Muslims'.

(Alavi, 1986: 22) 'The Bengal case is particularly relevant for illustrating not only the contingent nature of (Muslim) ethnicity but also the fact that neither Jinnah nor the Muslim League intended to create a state exclusively of Muslims or an Islamic state. Faced in May 1947 with the carving up of Bengal between India and Pakistan, influential Muslim as well as Hindu (congress) leaders of Bengal came together in support of an alternative plan for a united independent Bengal. Bengal Muslim League's Suharwardy

and some of his colleagues reached an agreement with Congress leaders Chandra Bose, Kiran Shankar Roy and other in support of the idea. It is most significant in the circumstances that this plan also had Jinnah's full support. After Suharwardy (on behalf of Bengal leadership) had presented Mountbatten the plan for an independent Bengal side by side with independent India and Pakistan; the later asked Jinnah what his attitude to such a plan would be, in the record of his interview with Jinnah, Mountbatten wrote; 'I asked Mr.Jinnah straight-out what his views were about keeping Bengal united at the price of its remaining out of Pakistan. He said without any hesitation, 'I would be delighted, what is the use of Bengal without Calcutta, they had much better remain united and independent (Jalal and Sugata Bose, 1997: 184-185) The plan was vetoed by the Congress high command, (Nehru & Patel) however, and Mountbatten accepted their veto'. From this plan of an independent Bengal it is very clear that Jinnah's aim was not that of bringing together all Muslims of India under a single state at any price.

After the creation of Pakistan, (Abdus Sattar 199: 1) Jinnah's idea about what the new state should be like was very clear as can be seen from his speeches and statements. In his address to the people of United States, in February 1948, he said, 'In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims-Hindus, Christians and Parsis-but they all are Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan'. Jinnah in his first speech to the constituent Assembly of Pakistan stated the principle on which the new state was to be founded, he said (Akbar S. Ahmad 1997:175) 'You may belong to any religion or caste or creed-that has nothing to do with the business of the state, we are starting with this fundamental principle that we

all are the citizens of one state. In the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state’.

THE ARRIVAL OF MILITANT ISLAM:

(Ahmad Rashid 1996:160) ‘The rise in Militancy and sectarian conflicts in Pakistan has its roots in the intensification of regional conflicts, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the start of the Afghan War in 1980s, Zia’s Islamization project and Pakistan’s failure to contain the impact of these development on its domestic politics. The Iranian Revolution changed the character of sectarian politics in Pakistan. Its impact on Shias was, however, more direct and that in turn influenced the politics of Sunni activism as well’. (Mushahid Hussain 1993) ‘The ideological force of the Revolution combined with the fact that the first Islamic revolution had been carried out by Shias, emboldened the Shia community and politicized its identity. Soon after the success of the revolution in Tehran, zealous emissaries of the revolutionary regime actively organized Pakistan’s shias.

(S.V.R.Nasr 2002:87) ‘Most important, the Zia regime was then in the midst of an ambitious Islamization project, which sought to transform government institutions, legal codes and policy making apparatuses in accordance with Islamic teachings. General Zia’s Islamization initiative, set in motion in 1979, claimed to manifest a universal Islamic vision. But in reality it was based on narrow Sunni interpretations of Islamic theology and law, and was therefore unacceptable to the Shias. In addition, Shias viewed Zia’s Islamization as a threat to their social position in Pakistan. The Shias made their opposition known when the Zia regime sought to implement Sunni law of inheritance and

Zakat (the obligatory Islamic alms tax). The TJP (Tahrik-e-Jafria Pakistan, Shias most powerful militant organization, when the TJP moved towards the pursuit of constitutional politics, Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan SMP took its place), demonstrated against the zakat ordinance and besieged the Federal Secretariat building in Islamabad for two days, the Shias argued that the government's proposals were not in line with their traditions. For centuries the Shias had maintained that Zakat should be donated on a voluntary basis and that no government had the right to collect it'. Faced with the strong Shias protest and the significant pressure by the revolutionary Iran made Zia to exempt Shias from all those aspects of the Islamization package that contravened Shia law.

(N.V.R.Nasr 2002:88) 'The Shia victory was considered a defeat for the ruling regime and for the Sunni Islamists. In the mind of Sunni Islamizers, Shiaism thus gradually becomes a problem for their desired Islamic State. This led Zia and his Islamist allies to develop a concerted strategy for containing Shia mobilization and limiting both Pakistanis Shias and Iran's influence in Pakistan. The SSP (Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Sunni Militant organization) was founded in September 1985 at Jhang, to counter the rise of Shiaism, and apparently had the financial support of the Saudi Arabia and Iraq, both countries were concerned about Shia influence in the region. The Saudi and Iraqi involvement in effect imported the Iran-Iraq war into Pakistan as the SSP and its allies on one hand and the TJP and its allies on the other. The sectarian conflicts acquired a new dimension from 1988, and particularly so when the so-called Afghan Jihad was brought in Pakistan, after the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan. The assassination of Allama Hussain in August 1988(Iraq was probably involved) was a turning point; it was the first of a long series of sectarian killings' that unleashed a cycle of inter-communal

violence, which are continued till today. In February 1990, the SSP movement's founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was assassinated, and then in December 1990 the consul general of Iran Sadiq Ganji was killed. The successors of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi were also murdered- Maulana Israr-ul-Qasmi in 1991 and Zia ul Rahman Farooqi in 1997, the last leader of the SSP was Maulana Azam Tariq assassinated in Islamabad on 6 October 2003. These sectarian killings were not only confined to leaders and activists, symbols of state authority, main government functionaries, police officers judges, doctors, lawyers and traders, from both sides, were also targeted. A change was seen in 1997 with indiscriminate gunfire on ordinary citizens who were not involved in sectarian activities and whose only fault was to be either Sunni or Shia. (Mariam Abou Zahab 2002:118)

6.3. MADARIS (seminaries)

At the time of Pakistan's independence there were an estimated 250 Madaris in the country. By 1987 it rose to 2,862, producing around 30,000 graduates each year, presently there are estimated 7000 to 8000 Madaris in Pakistan and between 60,000 to 70,000 students are attending them. Mostly in 1980s, these Madaris were established by Zia's regime, as these Madaris were needed to produce anti-Soviet fighters for the Afghan War and could also be used to counter the Shia influence at home. Huge investment was made, to strengthen various Sunni institutions-in particular. (S.V.R.Nasr 2002: 90) 'The Madaris received their fundings from larger religio-political parties or outside donors, and instruct their students in accordance with the sectarian beliefs and agenda to those donors (Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait). Their focus is less on training Ulema and more on producing sectarian activities, less on spiritual matters and more on sectarian hatred. Many Madaris provide military training to their students, combining sectarian vigilance with a Jihadist outlook, Students that come out of these seminaries have few skills that would encourage them to follow traditional careers in scholarship and religious services, or would allow them to join the mainstream economy. Many join the ranks of extremist Islamist parties and sectarian organizations'.

AFGHAN WAR:

(Ahmad Rashid 1996:161) 'The Afghan war that spanned the decade between 1979 and 1989 not only flooded Pakistan with weapons and drugs, but also embedded militancy in the country's Islamism. The Afghan war spawned several militant Islamist groups with international connections; according to one estimate over 25,000 volunteers from thirty

countries were trained in Pakistan and fought in Afghanistan'. In addition, the afghan scene itself was wrought with sectarian tension as Shias and Persian speaking pro-Iranian factions vied for power and position with the Saudi and American backed Mujahideen groups based in Pakistan' (Oliver Roy 1990). (S.V.R.Nasr 2002: 94) 'The rivalry between these two groups and the competition for control of Afghanistan ineluctably spilled over into Pakistan. Pakistan's sectarian conflict, therefore, quickly became a regional affair. As a result, Pakistan's response to sectarianism became entangled with its own afghan policy, the Afghan War was also important in that it flooded Pakistan with weapons of all kinds, and imprint militancy on its political culture, specially among Islamist groups. The 'Kalashnikov Culture' turned sectarian conflicts bloodier, and transformed militant organizations into paramilitary ones. The Kashmir conflict has played the same role, bolstering sectarianism in Pakistan'.

PRESENT SITUATION:

It is a great irony that the scourge of Islamic fundamentalism has done more damage to the social and religious fabric of Islamic Pakistan, than anything else. Today Pakistan is paying a heavy social and political price and has become a victim of its own creation. The present government of General Musharraf is finding it extremely difficult to clean up the mess of Islamic fundamentalism.

It took just a few hours for the US administration to conclude that the 11th September attack had probably originated from Afghanistan and that any effective counter-attack would require the co-operation of Pakistan. The American message for the whole world countries was that 'you are either with us or against us'. The Taliban government which

showed no compliance, and refused to handover 'Bin-Laden- number one suspect behind the September 11 attacks, had to go. (Benett Jones 2002: 2) 'Musharraf realized that once the US had made up its mind to topple the Taliban there was no point for Pakistan continuing to support them'. For General Musharraf it was not an easy task, it was not only the overthrow of Taliban government, but also directly confronting thousands of Islamic radicals within inside his own country, who took to the streets in all the major cities of Pakistan, swearing loyalty to their Islamic brethren in Afghanistan.

From the beginning of his rule, General Musharraf has never made any secret of his modernist views. While Zia had used his military might to try to Islamize Pakistan, Musharraf was indicating that he wanted to modernize the Pakistani State. (Bennett Jones 2002:20) 'The first act he did, in April 2000, he backed a proposal to reform Pakistan's notorious blasphemy law. The Islamic parties, however, strongly opposed the change and on May 2000, Musharraf backed down. Despite his failure to change the blasphemy law, Musharraf continued to express opposition to religious extremism. In June 2001, well before the attacks on the twin towers in New York, he gave a keynote speech to leading Pakistani Islamic scholars and clerics whom the government had transported to Islamabad for the purpose. His comments, which struck many of his audience dumb, comprised one of the clearest statements of Islamic modernism ever made by a Pakistani leader. 'How does the world look at us?' he asked, 'the world sees us backward and constantly going under. Is there any doubt that we have been left behind although we claim Islam will carry us forward in every age, every circumstances and every land... How does the world judge our claim? It looks upon us as terrorists. We have been killing each other. And now we want to spread violence and terror abroad. Naturally the world

regards us as terrorists. Our claim of tolerance is phony...we never tire of talking about the status that Islam accords to women. We only pay lip service to its teachings. We do not act upon it. This is hypocrisy'. (B.Jones: 21) The June speech was a major political event in Pakistan. Since the 1950s no Pakistani leader had dared to speak to the clerics in this way.

(Bennett Jones 2002:24) 'From the moment General Musharraf took power, he made it clear that he considered those involved in sectarian violence to be terrorists. In August 2001, he felt strong enough to ban 'Lashkar-e-Jhangvi' and 'Sipah-e-Mohammad' Pakistan. The ban marked a significant development, which indicated that Musharraf was prepared to take some risks in confronting the Islamic radicals. But once again there were questions about implementation. The killing rate did diminish after the ban-but only for a few weeks. In practical terms, the ban made little difference since many activists from the two organizations, already wanted for murder, and was keeping a low profile. Nevertheless, Musharraf had laid down the foundations of his policy towards religious extremism and, after 11 September, he was to build on it. Before 11 September he had concentrated his attack on those responsible for sectarian violence. In the immediate aftermath of 11 September he had seen off the pro-Taliban clerics who tried to organize street protests against him. But he still faced one major obstacle that stood in the way of a full-blow assault on the radicals: Kashmir'.

Kashmir- the unsettled problem of the British Partition of Indian-Sub-continent is a disputed area between Pakistan and India. Pakistan argues that this unsettled problem should be solved according to the United Nations Resolutions, while India considers Kashmir as its own part; both the countries had fought three wars over Kashmir. Ever

since 1988, when the insurgency against the Indian security forces in Kashmir had begun, Pakistan had officially provided diplomatic, moral and political support to the Kashmiri militants.

After 11th September US policy changed. The fundamental problem for Pakistan was that the United States was no longer prepared to accept Islamabad's claims that there was no connection between Afghanistan and Kashmir. Washington had a point. Links clearly did exist. For a start, Taliban and the Pakistani-based Kashmiri militant groups had the same origins. Both had emerged from the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan. Throughout the 1990s Pakistan's military establishment felt it was in a strong position. Its close ties to the Taliban allowed the ISI to produce a cadre of well-trained militants who could fight in Kashmir. But after 11 September the policy unraveled. The US was no longer prepared to turn a blind eye to the Afghanistan-Kashmir nexus. Having decided to back the US-led coalition Musharraf had nowhere to turn. Then on 13 December 2001 Indian parliament was attacked by five armed men, during the thirty-minute gun battle the attackers killed six Indian security personnel and a gardener before they too were shot down. Nobody claimed responsibility for the attack but Indian leaders immediately blamed Pakistan-backed Islamic militants. From this incident the already unpleasant relations between the two countries, got worse. India called its commissioner from Islamabad, cut rail and other transport links with Pakistan and moved missiles, fighter aircrafts and tens of thousands of troops to the Pakistani border. The prospect of yet another military conflict, possibly full-scale war, between two nuclear powers put Musharraf under still more pressure. (Bennett Jones 2002:27)

The general now realized that he had little choice but to reverse Pakistan's long-standing policy of backing the Kashmir insurgency. On 12 January 2002 he delivered a landmark speech in which he announced a ban of almost all the most prominent Pakistan-based militant groups, he said 'No organization will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir'.

CONCLUSION:

Islam has always been exploited and politicized by different leaders in Pakistan. The most prominent amongst them was General Zia-ul-Haq, who not only politicized religion but militarized it as well. It is very much true that Islam is rooted in the Pakistani society but not the militant Islam. Pakistan was certainly not made for religious extremism. (Mariam Abou Zahab 2002:115) 'The Sunni-Shia conflicts were mostly unknown before partition in the areas which now form Pakistan because of the influence of Pirs and Sufis, relations between Shias and Sunni remained normal except for occasional riots or minor clashes during Muharram ceremonies. The state was neutral and had no sectarian agenda'. It was later on that these militant-sectarian organizations were created and nursed by different regimes for their own political purposes. (Tariq Ali: 195) 'The strength of religious extremism has till now been derived from state patronage rather than popular support. These militant groups that have paralyzed the country for two decades were the creation of General Zia-ul-Haq, who received political, Military and financial support from the United States and Britain throughout his eleven years as dictator of Pakistan'. The west needed Zia to fight its Afghan war against the former Soviet Union, and Zia needed the Mullahs' political support for his illegal regime and also to utilize 'Mullah Power' to

combat Pakistan's People's Party (PPP) and groups further to the left.(Tariq Ali 1983:139). Zia Islamization, the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and the Afghan War and Kashmir were enabling factors, which gave scale and sustenance to the sectarianism and militancy in Pakistan. The present government of General Musharraf has, for the first time, demonstrated to reverse Zia's legacy. Ironically both men were presented with the opportunity to pursue their diametrically opposed agendas because Washington needed to secure Pakistan's support to determine the course of events in Afghanistan. Only one of his predecessors, Ayub Khan, attempted to confront the radicals. He failed. It is not yet clear whether Musharraf will succeed? (Bennett Jones 2002:30-33)

6.4. HINDUTVA AND THE POLITICIZATION OF RELIGION IDENTITY IN INDIA

Q: How Civic Nationalism turned into Ethnic Nationalism of the Hindutva ideology?

Ans: Political transformation in Indian politics, for instance, the decline of INC in the late 1980s, and the gradual erosion of democratic structures are the two most common reasons given to explain the rise of the Hindu nationalist party.

But why religious identity was particularly prone to politicization in India?

(Politicization of religion)

To answer this question we have delve into a popular debate over secularism in India.

The debate provides important insight into the **relationship between secularism, modernity and the politicization of religious identity**. It will be argued that the institutional practice of secularism and the processes of modernization made religion a political category that was particularly prone to politicization.

Hindutva and the Politicization of Religious Identity in India

Ideological Foundation of Hindu Nationalism and its Institutionalization: Hindu revivalist movements of the early 20th century. Veer Savarkar's elaboration of Hindutva in *Essentials of Hindutva (1922)*. Originally the movement was conceptualized as a social

and religious movement, Hindu Nationalism soon set out to transformed their movement into a political force in opposition to the Congress party and AIML. The result was the institutionalization of Hindu Nationalism with the establishment of the RSS and BJP.

The Emergence of Political Hindutva (late 1980s): the history of BJP struggle to power. In the Lok Sabha (the lower house) 2 seats in 1984, in 1989, it had 85 seats, in 1991, it won 119 seats and finally 182 seats in 1999.

The rise of BJP: Ashutosh Varshney and Rajni Kothari explanations of the rise of BJP

Political Transformation: The decline of Congress Party in the late 1980s. The subsequent loss of confidence in the Congress party created an ideological and organizational vacuum in Indian politics which opposing parties such as the BJP and the CPI (Communist Party of India) could seize to propagate their ideological positions.

The Authoritarianism of the Congress Party under Indira Gandhi:

Absent from the above two analysis, however, is a coherent account of the salience of religious identity in Indian politics. After all, one must ask why religious nationalism in particular had such rallying potential in the climate of political disillusionment of the 1980s? Any account which attempts to explain the degeneration of civic nationalism into ethnic nationalism must adequately theorize the reasons why a particular ethnic identity has the propensity for mass appeal and politicization.

This paper seeks to critically examine why religious identity in India became so rapidly politicized in the 1980s. The most systematic treatment of the politicization of religious

identity in India is to be found in the lively debate about the prospects of secularism as a viable mechanism for religious accommodation.

Is Secularism the cause of politicization of religious identity? As the scale and intensity of religious conflict increases, and religious minorities feel insecure about their position within the Indian polity, some critics have begun to question the effectiveness of secularism as a mechanism of religious accommodation. Some have concluded that secularism lacks the potential to deter religious conflict in India, and even go so far as to claim a direct causal link between the conceptual structure of the doctrine of secularism and the re-emergence of problems concerning religious and inter-communal relations.

Hindu Nationalism emerged as a particularly powerful force in this context for two reasons.

1. It was able to tap into and **exploit the feelings of ‘threat’** exhibited by the dominant Hindu community and
2. It was able **to adapt to the processes of technological and economic modernization**, making Hinduism more relevant to capitalist modernity.

THE DEBATE OVER SECULARISM IN INDIA:

Critique of Indian Secularism:

Pierre Van Den Berghe, Ashis Nandy and T.N Madan have all sought to make a strong connection between the practice and ideology of secularism and the politicization of religion in India.

Secularism: It has generally been understood to mean the separation of religion from the policy and practice of the state. However, there has been debate about precisely what this ‘separation’ entails. For some, the secularity of the state requires that no support be given to religion in any form (*non-interference policy*), while for others it entails supporting all religions to the same degree (*interventionist practice of secularism*). In India, secularism takes the latter form where the state assumes a more interventionist role in the religious domain.

Secularism: the specific practices and policies the state uses to assert its independence from the religious domain (*practice*).

Secularization: a more general process of decline in religious influence and religious identity in modern life (*values*).

Den Berghe (blaming secularism) is critically against the interventionist practices of secularism in India. He draws a link between the Indian secular practice of recognizing religious identity on the basis of group rights and the escalating levels of religious violence, since ‘ethnic consciousness is increased and social cleavages deepened’ by such policies. He would advocate a policy of non-interference rather than the India practice of equal intervention which results in the recognition of collective rights for various religious groups. In that sense, this line of critique would see the policies and practices of secularism as responsible for the increasing politicization of religious identity in India.

Madan and Nandy (blaming secularization) focuses less on the practice of secularism and more on the values that underlie the doctrine. Secularization is being characterized by Nandy as a process that purges modern life of traditional and religious ways of conceptualizing the world, resulting in the alienation of large parts of the population. Nandy argues that this sense of alienation from modern, secular life is a fertile mindset for intolerance and aggression. He contends, 'Much of the fanaticism and violence associated with religion comes today from the sense of defeat of the believers, from their feelings of impotence, and from their free-floating anger and self-hatred while facing a world which is increasingly secular and de-sacralized.' Thus, the crux of Nandy's argument is that secularization, as part of the larger processes of modernization, fuels resentment and anger that then gets channeled into an aggressive politicization of religious identity.

T.N Madan's critique of secularization is also in many ways a critique of modernization; however, Madan is keen to emphasize the specificity of secularism as a Western idea. Madan sees the cultural core of South Asian societies as profoundly religious and a secular framework that cannot acknowledge this character will politicize religious identity in dangerous ways as it becomes a source of resistance to the alien, secular world-view.

Thomas Blom Hansen locates his explanation for the rise of Hindu Nationalism in 'a broader democratic transformation of both the political field and the public culture in post-colonial India'. Hansen elaborates on this transformation as an 'intensification of political mobilization among the lower castes and the minorities' and 'the rise of ambiguous desires of consumerism in everyday life and the exposure to global cultural

and economic flows'. He argues that these developments in the political field and public culture of contemporary India 'fractured social imaginings and notions of order and hierarchy, prompting millions of Hindus to embrace Hindu Nationalist promises of order, discipline, and collective strength'.

Dan Berghe for instance had critiqued the institutional practices of secularism as responsible for the politicization of religious identity and the intolerance and violence that followed. Hansen does not discard this argument since he also argues that the mobilization of the lower castes and religious minorities through India's policies of official recognition were a deep source of anxiety for the dominant upper-caste Hindu community. However, he is careful to emphasize that the polarization of the Hindu identity was a majoritarian backlash from privileged Hindus who wanted to seek security and recognition under the Hindutva ideology of cultural pride, order, and national strength. This point is crucial because it stresses the ways in which a perceived 'threat' to the identity of the dominant group often has the most dangerous consequences of persecution, conflict, and violence. Therefore, in trying to understand the conditions under which the politicization of ethnic identity escalates to violent conflict, it would be judicious to keep in mind which groups feel threatened because of their pre-established dominance in society.

Both Nandy and Madan are keen to emphasize that secularization, as a part and parcel of the modernization process, is the source of religious conflict in India. They argue that the de-legitimization of religion in public life represses an essential character of South Asian society, which returns in perverted forms of fanaticism and bigotry. In a similar vein, Hansen maintains his focus on modernization as a central category of analysis, but

questions the notion that religion has been 'repressed' in modern society. Instead, he puts forth the argument that religion has become more prominent in modern life because it has shown a remarkable capacity to adapt and adjust to the different dimensions of modernity. For instance, he argues that the Hindu Nationalist movement often 'acknowledges the powerful attraction of Western consumerism and modern technology but emphasize that the prerequisite for developing a sovereign national modernity is the cultural unity and purity of the Hindu nation. Thus, modernization has not accelerated the pace of secularization in society as Nandy and Madan contend, rather religion found new ways of existing in modern India by adapting to the technological and consumer revolution.

Two corollaries can be gleaned from this theoretical discussion of the rise of Hindu Nationalism in India. On the one hand, the interventionist and reformist policies of secularism threatened the dominant Hindu community and caused them to react by turning to the ideology of Hindutva for security and recognition, for example Muslim Personal Laws and the Mendal Commission's report of 1992.

On the other hand, Hindu Nationalism's ability to adapt and adjust to the processes of economic and technological modernization strengthened its appeal to a growing Hindu middle class which envisioned a modern and prosperous India fully integrated into the global economy.

Secularism and the Anxieties of Citizenship

The relationship between the state and religion in India has often been perplexing and unclear. While, secularism in India has often resulted in interventionist policies of social and religious reform, they have not always been consistently applied to all religious communities, nor easily accepted by the dominant groups within a religious community. Thus creating a common citizenship in India has always been a rather complicated task. These problems are best exemplified in the debate over instituting a Uniform Civil Code and the ferocious protest by upper-caste groups to the findings and recommendations of the Mandal Commission in the 1990s.

Sources of Anxiety Shaha Bano Case and Mandal Commission.

... The BJP added fuel to this grievance by insisting that the demands of „other“ communities to maintain their retrogressive personal laws was threatening a sense of common citizenship and consequently, the integrity of the nation itself. By playing up the notion of „threat“ skillfully, the BJP planted potent seeds of insecurity, which allowed them to steadily politicize religious identity as a major force in Indian politics.

The sense of security and status which the upper caste groups had enjoyed for centuries was suddenly shattered by the Mandal Commission’s findings and recommendations, heightening their sense of vulnerability within the Indian polity. In this context, the BJP’s communalist discourse became especially appealing to the socially disenfranchised groups who felt that their world was being encroached on by lower caste communities. Although the BJP did not object to the implementation of the Mandal commission, its antipathy to some aspects of the report was well known.

The provision for religious communities to abide by their own Personal laws in matters relating to marriage and family; and the recommendations put forth by the Mandal Commission in the 1990s to redress past injustices are two ways in which secularism is put to practice in India.

Yet, these issues also confirm Thomas Hansen's argument that the BJP politicized the dominant Hindu identity by shoring up the notion of „threat“ to the nation-state by 'pseudo-secular' policies that 'pamper' religious minorities and lower castes groups. Hansen's emphasis on how the dominant community is often politicized by a 'perceived threat' is essential because it provides a better explanation for why conflicts between Hindus and Muslims have been particularly frequent and violent in India

Modernity and Religion

The relationship between modernity, religion and the emergence of Hindu Nationalism is complex and often difficult to articulate. Ashis Nandy and T.N Madan view religion and modernity as opposing forces. They argue that the accelerated pace of modernization has resulted in the repression of religion in public life and its subsequent perversion into fanaticism and bigotry. However, Thomas Hansen does not attribute the development of religious fanaticism to the repression of religion in modern life. Instead, he argues that religious nationalism thrives in contemporary India because of its capacity to adapt and accommodate to the processes of modernization.

The use of mass media technology and the selective integration of India into the global economy are two striking examples of Hindu Nationalism's ability to exploit the processes of modernization to expand its sphere of influence. Mass media was

fundamental to spreading its reach to far-flung villages and towns across India, while global economic integration was essential to capturing a growing middle class vote. Thus, contrary to the claims made by the anti-secularists such as Nandy and Madan, the processes of modernization did not successfully repress the role of religion in public life. Instead, certain aspects of modernization proved to be a crucial vehicle for expanding the reach of Hindu Nationalism. As a result, an analysis of modernity and religion that puts emphasis on secularization as the primary explanation for the emergence of Hindu Nationalism is wrong-headed. It is clear that religious identity was able to gain the imaginative hold over Hindus in India by adapting and adjusting to the processes of modernization.

However, Madan and Nandy's articulation of the relationship between modernity, religion, and the emergence of Hindu Nationalism, does prompt us to ask why modernization did not lead to increased secularization of society, as it had in the West. One possible answer to this question could be related to the highly technological and capitalist modernization that India underwent without having sufficiently undergone a democratic revolution that ensured meaningful freedoms and social equality. Thus, the incomplete democratic revolution meant that the spread of reason and mass literacy could not fully facilitate the process of secularization in society.

The Future of Hindu Nationalism

...although, a lack of internal cohesion with respect to ideology and strategy is a clear obstacle to the further expansion of the movement, the likelihood of resurgence is not out of the question. If Hindu Nationalism is able to find new ways of exploiting the anxieties,

insecurities and possibilities created by modernization, it will continue to play a prominent role in Indian politics.