

Dutch Stocks Starting With H...

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HAL Trust – AMS: HAL – The Dutch Berkshire

Hal Investments is an investment company created when HAL (Holland-America Line) sold its shipping activities in 1989. Since it has been investing and divesting and we have to look at the specific pieces to determine its value.

The holding structure did pretty well over the last two decades where without including dividends, the stock has returns around 10% per year which is not bad.

Market Summary > HAL Trust

152,00 EUR

+129.79 (584.38%) ↑ all time

15 Nov, 17:35 CET • Disclaimer

AMS: HAL

+ Follow

1D | 5D | 1M | 6M | YTD | 1Y | 5Y | Max



Open	151,40	Mkt cap	13,18B	52-wk high	159,80
High	152,00	P/E ratio	11,47	52-wk low	114,00
Low	151,20	Div yield	1,55%		

Hal Trust Stock – AMS:HAL

Let's see if they can keep compounding.

Hal Trust Stock Analysis – Overview

Below are the owned businesses.

List of Principal subsidiaries and minority interests

As of June 30, 2021

Name	Country of incorporation	Nature of business	Interest in common shares	Interest in preferred shares	Non-controlling interest
Subsidiaries					
HAL Holding N.V.	Curaçao	Holding company	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
HAL International N.V.	Curaçao	Holding company	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
HAL International Investments N.V.	Curaçao	Holding company	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
HAL Investments N.V.	Curaçao	Holding company	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
HAL Real Estate Inc.	U.S.A.	Real estate	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
HAL Investments B.V.	The Netherlands	Holding company	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Atlas Professionals B.V.	The Netherlands	Staffing	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Orthopedie Investments Europe B.V.	The Netherlands	Orthopedic devices	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%
FD Mediagroep B.V.	The Netherlands	Media	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%
Broadview Holding B.V.	The Netherlands	Industrial	97.4%	0.0%	2.6%
Koninklijke Ahrend B.V.	The Netherlands	Office furniture	96.0%	100.0%	4.0%
Floramedia Group B.V.	The Netherlands	Communication	96.0%	100.0%	4.0%
Sports Timing Holding B.V.	The Netherlands	Timing equipment	95.5%	100.0%	4.5%
Infomedics Holding B.V.	The Netherlands	Financial services	95.3%	0.0%	4.7%
Timber and Building Supplies Holland N.V.	The Netherlands	Building materials	94.3%	0.0%	5.7%
AN Direct B.V.	The Netherlands	Hearing aids	90.0%	0.0%	10.0%
SB Real Estate	The Netherlands	Real estate	90.0%	0.0%	10.0%
Van Wijnen Holding B.V.	The Netherlands	Construction	88.3%	0.0%	11.7%
HR Top Holding B.V.	The Netherlands	HR services	81.0%	100.0%	19.0%
GrandVision N.V.	The Netherlands	Optical retail	76.7%	0.0%	23.3%
Anthony Veder Group N.V.	Curaçao	Shipping Greenhouse projects	62.9%	0.0%	37.1%
GreenV B.V.	The Netherlands	projects	60.0%	0.0%	40.0%
Controlled minority interests					
Safilo Group S.p.A.	Italy	Optical products	49.84%	0.00%	50.16%
Koninklijke Vopak N.V.	The Netherlands	Tank terminals	48.15%	0.00%	51.85%

All the above entities are included in the consolidation. The proportion of the effective voting rights in the respective entity are virtually equal to the proportion of the ordinary shares held.

Hal Trust Holdings – Source: [Hal Trust Interim Report](#)

Then there are stakes in big companies like Boskalis ([Boskalis stock analysis](#)), SBM and Coolblue.

Non-controlled minority interests

Publicly traded

Koninklijke Boskalis Westminster N.V.	45.54%
SBM Offshore N.V.	21.91%

Other

Coolblue B.V.	49.00%
DMF Investment Management B.V.	25.00%

Hal Trust Holdings – Source: [Hal Trust Interim Report](#)

Now we have to value things, and then it is about seeing how this at a price fits your investment requirements.

Hal Trust Stock Valuation

The market capitalization is 13.18 billion EUR. Of that 5.5 Billion will be received for GrandVision leaving us at 7.68 billion. 1.5 billion is for Boskalis, that I consider a bit too expensive for the ugliness of the business (6.18 billion). 2.1 billion for Vopak (4.08 billion). Half a billion for SBM Offshore (1.6 billion).

Coolblue should be made public soon, so we can estimate a dilution there and a stake of 40% after going public, at a valuation that should make it look interesting. For now, they do not see favorable market conditions to go public.



Press release

HAL

INTENDED IPO OF COOLBLUE POSTPONED

Today, Coolblue announced the decision to postpone the intended initial public offering on Euronext Amsterdam until further notice, due to adverse market conditions for IPO's relating to e-commerce companies. HAL has a 48.88% ownership interest in Coolblue.

HAL Holding N.V.

October 13, 2021

07h15

This press release contains inside information relating to HAL Trust within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the EU Market Abuse Regulation.

Coolblue IPO – Source: [Hal Trust](#)

The [estimations](#) are around 4 billion, thus 2 billion for HAL. Thus, I am already in value on my calculations as by deducting 2 billion from the above 1.6 billion, I am at -0.4 billion.

Then there is so much more, Technip:



Press release

HAL

HAL TO ACQUIRE A 9.9% STAKE IN TECHNIP ENERGIES N.V.

HAL entered into an agreement with TechnipFMC plc to acquire a 9.9% stake (net of treasury shares) in Technip Energies N.V. at a price per share of € 11.15, corresponding to a total investment of € 196 million. Technip Energies is an engineering and technology company that primarily targets energy and downstream markets, including energy transition markets. It has approximately 15,000 employees, has its headquarters in Paris, and is listed on Euronext Paris. Its revenues over 2020 amounted to € 5.7 billion.

HAL will first acquire a 4.9% stake in Technip Energies from TechnipFMC with settlement in the coming days. The transfer to HAL of the remaining 5.0% stake is subject to approval by the Brazilian competition authority, and is expected early in the fourth quarter of 2021. HAL has agreed to a 180-day lock-up period for the to be acquired shares.

I am at -0.6 billion.



Press release

HAL

HAL TO ACQUIRE PRO GAMERS GROUP

HAL signed an agreement to acquire 64% of the shares in CaseGi Holding GmbH (“Pro Gamers Group”) based on a total enterprise valuation of € 820 million (cash-and-debt-free). The company is active in several countries in the online retail and distribution of computer gaming equipment and accessories, both with own and third party brands. Pro Gamers Group has own web shops in, amongst others, Germany, Finland, United Kingdom and Australia. Sales over the financial year ending April 30, 2021, were € 627 million. The company is based in Berlin and has approximately 700 employees.

The completion of the transaction is subject to conditions customary for transactions of this nature, including approval by the relevant competition authorities.

HAL Holding N.V.

June 29, 2021

08h30

Donw to -1.1 billion.

Then more, [best overview here](#).

Ahrend – furniture – sales 268 million.

An Direct – 32 million sales

Anthoni Veder – Gas Tankers

Atlas Professionals – Sales 160 millino

Broadview holding – sales 1 billion

DMFCO – sales 53 million

FD Media Groep – 88 million sales

Floramedia – 39 million sales

GreenV – sales 130 million

Infomedics – 60 million sales

MyLaps – 15 million sales

Orthopedie Investments – 261 million sales

Rotter y Krauss – 50 million sales

Safilo – 780 million sales

Tabs – 788 million sales

Van Wijnen – 1 billion sales – 126 million paid!

	DOS	Van Wijnen	Privé Revaux	Blenders	Other	Total
Cash paid	49.2	126.9	61.6	57.6	16.7	312.0
Future consideration	-	-	1.8	-	-	1.8
Fair value of net assets acquired	(19.8)	(102.6)	(63.6)	(68.8)	(11.9)	(266.7)
Non-controlling interest recognized	-	-	24.6	20.6	-	45.2
Goodwill	29.4	24.3	24.4	9.4	4.8	92.3
Badwill (in consolidated statement of income)	-	-	-	-	(0.6)	(0.6)

Goodwill in amount of € 33.8 million is expected to be deductible for tax purposes.

According to the company, the share is close to book value, that fluctuates as the stocks owned fluctuate.

Hal Investment Stock Conclusion

As a holding company there will always be a discount, but as it is usual with these family owned companies, there is always value somewhere too.

I don't see anything bad, but also nothing stellar. Coolblue is the gem likely, if they can keep on developing it, even if the market in the Netherlands is pretty saturated. Maybe they can sell it to Amazon one day so you never know.

The dividend is there, enough to keep the owners rich likely, if they can compound on that, it will be good.

An interesting development is the building of a real estate empire with Van Wijnen, the wood business, mortgage business and other related businesses. If they can build scale and efficiency in the very inefficient and expensive Dutch real estate market, that might by itself make good money over time.

This looks like a mini Dutch Berkshire, the long-term investing results will depend on the management delivering the magic like Buffett did. Will they be able to do it? Really hard to know, or better to say unlikely as Warren collected cash machine businesses with high margins while this looks mostly like an agglomeration of average to bad businesses.

Heijmans Stock Analysis

I often get question about construction stocks, but their track record after the great financial crisis has been terrible. Plus, we are still in a world of extreme financial engineering and I simply don't know how will most of these companies survive when and if things change.

Market Summary > Heijmans N.V.

14,76 EUR

-41.59 (-73.78%) ↓ all time

17 Nov, 14:19 CET • Disclaimer

AMS: HEIJM

+ Follow

1D | 5D | 1M | 6M | YTD | 1Y | 5Y | Max




Open	14,92	Mkt cap	336,85M	CDP score	B
High	14,92	P/E ratio	9,49	52-wk high	15,40
Low	14,70	Div yield	4,94%	52-wk low	8,60

Heijmans stock price historical chart

The thing is that the real estate business is one where you are owned by the banks, as long as banks allow you to do business and finance you, everything is ok. But as soon as banks say no, you pretty much become at their mercy. Let's see if that is the case with Heijmans.

Heijmans business overview

The company is still in the process of restructuring after the great financial crisis.



COMPANY PROFILE

Restructuring provides potential

- Following the credit crisis and several project losses, Heijmans has gone through a strategic restructuring process since 2009:
- Focus on core activities in the Netherlands
 - Divestment of all foreign operations
 - Reduction of strategic land bank positions
 - Streamline organisation with centralisation of activities and one ERP platform (SAP)
 - Improve contract, risk & project management through 'Improve the core' and 'Focus, Discipline, and Excellence' program
 - All divisions returned to sustained profitability since 2018, Heijmans now wants to build on the 'Better, Smarter, Sustainable' strategy ⁸

Source: [Heijmans investor relations](#)

It is all interesting, the Dutch market for RE is expected to remain strong, but these companies simply can't make money.

EBTIDA margin of 6% is really not much – after TIDA you are not left with much.

heijmans

Property development: rising revenue and result

x € 1 million	H1 2021	H1 2020	2020	Δ % 2021-2020
Revenues	288	224	482	29%
Underlying EBITDA	19	14	30	
Underlying EBITDA margin	6,6%	6,3%	6,2%	
Order book	571	492	540	

- Continued pressure on the housing market
- Excellent start to 2021: more home sales and rising revenue and result
- Number of homes sold in H1: 1,209 (2020: 1,075), with 873 of these sold to private buyers (2020: 610). Strong sales figures result in relatively low inventory of homes for sale
- Lack of plan capacity and slow issuance of building permits
- Heijmans also investing in land holdings for its own land bank

Source: [Heijmans investor relations](#)

It all looks good, they make 40 million which is a PE ratio less than 10.

heijmans

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

P&L

	H1 2021	H1 2020	2020
<i>x € 1 million</i>			
Revenues	881	839	1.746
Property development	19	14	30
Building & Technology	16	14	25
Infra (excluding Wintrack II)	37	17	36
Wintrack II	-34		
Corporate	-3	-4	-6
Underlying EBITDA	35	41	85
Correction EBITDA joint ventures	-4	5	10
Write down on property assets	-1	0	-2
Restructuring costs	-1	-1	-3
EBITDA	29	45	90
Depreciation/amortisation	-17	-17	-34
Operating result	12	28	56
Financial results	-3	-3	-5
Share of profit of associates and joint ventures	3	-3	-11
Result before tax	12	22	40
Income tax	-2	-7	0
Result after tax	10	15	40

Source: [Heijmans investor relations](#)

But I really don't know what can happen beyond that.

Maybe somebody will disrupt the construction sector and make cheaper better houses, that would be a game changer.

Anyhow, thin margins in a cyclical sector, are not a place I like to be involved. Higher interest rates might make this an ugly sector for longer. I hope nothing bad happens, but just the risk prevents me of investing, especially with single digit dividends.

Heineken Stock Analysis

Heineken is a blue chip stock, has been around for a while and has delivered ok returns to investors over the past decades. A nice 10-bagger over 25 years leads to a 9.6% annualized return, add the dividends and you get to above 10% per year which is not bad.

Market Summary > Heineken N.V.

95,52 EUR

+85.71 (873.70%) ↑ all time

17 Nov, 17:39 CET • Disclaimer

AMS: HEIA

+ Follow

1D | 5D | 1M | 6M | YTD | 1Y | 5Y | Max




Heineken stock price historical chart

I would argue it is going to be extremely hard for the company to do the same over the next 25 years because the global expansion enjoyed over the last decades is ending, there is more and more competition from various local breweries and the market is expected to grow at a much slower rate. Plus, the current valuation is extremely high from a historical perspective.

Track record of delivering superior growth

Revenue OG
avg 2015-2019¹



1. Other brewers (ABL, CARLB, STZ & TAP); Spirits (DGE, CPR, RCO & RI); Food (NESN, BN & ULVR); Soft Drinks (CCH, CCEP & BVIC). Organic revenue growth as reported by corporates in each year




Disciplined use of capital

- 1 Improve operating capital efficiency and cash flow conversion
- 2 Rigorous financial discipline towards investments
- 3 Committed to Net Debt to EBITDA ratio <2.5
- 4 Sustain healthy dividend pay-out of 30-40% of Net Profit (beia)



Recover operating margin by 2023 and gear for operating leverage beyond



1. Excludes 2020 cost mitigations

Phasing


	2020-2021H1	2021H2 - 2023	2024 and beyond
	Mitigate	Recover & Build	Grow & Expand
Growth	Pandemic revenue impact	Post pandemic top-line recovery	Superior growth
Productivity	Short-term mitigation	€2bn productivity programme	Operating leverage Cost-conscious culture
Investments	Reduce all discretionary spend Selective capex investments	Restore M&S spend levels Frontload D&T investment	Scale brand investment Leverage D&T investment
S&R and People	Health & safety focus New team	Launch next level S&R programme Build spiky capabilities	S&R delivery Networked organisation

Latest Financial Overview – FY 2020


Key Financials €m unless otherwise stated	FY 2020	Total Growth	Organic Growth
Revenue	23,770	-16.7%	
Net revenue (beia)	19,724		-11.9%
Operating profit (beia)	2,421		-35.6%
Operating profit (beia) margin	12.3%	-455 bps	
Net profit (beia)	1,154		-49.4%
Net loss	-204	-109.4%	
Diluted EPS (beia) in €	2.00	-54.3%	
Free operating cash flow	1,513		
Net Debt/EBITDA (beia) ratio	3.4x		

For more information: [FY20 Results Press Release](#)


Consolidated Beer Volumes Organic Growth %



Diluted EPS (beia)



Dividend per share and pay-out ratio



Dividend Policy

Dividend pay-out ratio of 30%-40% of net profit before exceptional items and amortisation of brands (net profit beia).

Dividends are paid as an interim dividend and a final dividend. The interim dividend is fixed at 40% of the total dividend of the previous year.


Annual dividend proposals will remain subject to shareholder approval.

Overview of financial debt position

Total Interest Bearing Debt¹ of €18.2bn



Funding Sources



- Euro Medium Term Note program of €20 billion listed on Luxembourg stock exchange
- USD 4 billion of outstanding 144a notes issued in the US debt capital markets
- Group Revolving Credit Facility of €3.5 billion (currently undrawn) committed by 19 banks maturing in 2024
- Euro Commercial Paper program of €2 billion with a Short Term European Paper (STEP) label

¹ Reflects the impact of the change in accounting policy on netting of cash and overdraft balances in cash pooling arrangements. The amount subject to legal offset rights, but not netted in the statement of financial position is € 235m. If netted, Gross debt would amount to € 17,961m. Taking the cash balances into account as well, the net debt amounts to € 14,210m as per 31 Dec 2020.

1.7% interest rate

China - Revenue in the Beer segment amounts to US\$121,907m in 2021. The market is expected to grow annually by 5.54% (CAGR 2021-2025).

In global comparison, most revenue is generated in China (US\$121,907m in 2021).

In relation to total population figures, per person revenues of US\$83.97 are generated in 2021.

By 2025, 72% of spending and 50% of volume consumption in the Beer segment will be attributable to out-of-home consumption (e.g., in bars and restaurants).

In the Beer segment, volume is expected to amount to 45,795.3ML by 2025. The market for Beer segment is expected to show a volume growth of 2.2% in 2022.

The average volume per person in the Beer segment is expected to amount to 29.44 L in 2021.

India

India [Beer Market Outlook](#). The India beer market was stood at a value of **nearly INR 371 billion in 2020**. The industry is further expected to reach approximately INR 662 billion by 2026, exhibiting an estimated CAGR of about 9.2% during 2022-2027.

Heineken Stock Analysis – Investment thesis

Heineken is definitely a good global company with a strong brand. If the business develops as expected I would say the returns will be 1% dividend plus 5% growth. Perhaps the dividend will go to 2% on higher earnings when Covid normalizes so we are at 7%, if things remain as is; where the company keeps expanding in the long-term and the required dividend yield from the market remains equal to the current. So, nothing wrong, the IF is just too big of a risk for me.

Holland Colours – construction cyclical

Colours are cyclical, so maybe looking at it now is a bit on the wrong side of the cycle, but the business didn't look that bad in the past.

Market Summary > Holland Colours NV

172,50 EUR

+75.62 (78.06%) ↑ all time

19 Nov, 15:34 CET • Disclaimer

AMS: HOLCO

+ Follow

1D | 5D | 1M | 6M | YTD | 1Y | 5Y | Max



Open	175,00	Mkt cap	149,28M	52-wk high	185,00
High	175,00	P/E ratio	13,48	52-wk low	95,50
Low	175,00	Div yield	5,83%		

That can't be that the market cap was just 14 million in 2012?? With 3.5 million in net profit on 60 million in revenues?? There must be something wrong with the above stock price chart. Or, we know what to look for, PE ratios of 4 that then turn into PE ratio of 1 on current earnings. That is a 10 bagger.

The dividend is still good, there will be ups and downs, but I don't think 10x potential anymore. They are also doing buybacks now, when the stock is 10x. Very interesting story.

What can happen next? Well, somebody could take it over, but also in a bad cycle the income could fall etc. Especially as the building and construction markets can get ugly. (look at 1999 to 2012)

All in all, an interesting one, who knows if I'll cross it again.

Hunter Douglas – construction cyclical

Another construction company. But, I prefer looking at construction in a downturn, but in a downturn there will be also better opportunities in commodities, so no real interest in construction whatsoever.

Hunter
Douglas



HunterDouglas 

Window covering
company

Hunter Douglas N.V. is a Dutch multinational corporation. Its principal business is making window blinds and coverings. The company is publicly listed; the CEO, Ralph Sonnenberg, owns more than 80% of the stock. The head office is in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and a management office in Lucerne, Switzerland. [Wikipedia](#)

Headquarters: [Rotterdam, Netherlands](#)

Number of employees: 23,618

Founded: 1919, [Düsseldorf, Germany](#)

Subsidiaries: [LEVOLOR](#), [Hunter Douglas Inc.](#), [Hillarys](#), [MORE](#)

Executives: [G.C. Neoh](#), [Aad Kuiper](#), [Renato Rocha](#), [Ron Kass](#)

Presidents: [David H. Sonnenberg](#), [Marko H. Sonnenberg](#), [Renato Rocha](#), [G.C. Neoh](#)

Things have recently exploded as there is extreme demand for glass, again, to look when nobody wants glass and there is oversupply. Those times will come again.

97,00 EUR

+82.36 (562.57%) ↑ all time

22 Nov, 15:52 CET • Disclaimer

AMS: HDG

+ Follow

1D | 5D | 1M | 6M | YTD | 1Y | 5Y | Max



Open	98,50	Mkt cap	3,41B	52-wk high	107,00
High	98,90	P/E ratio	10,89	52-wk low	50,20
Low	96,80	Div yield	-		

Hydratec Industries – niche but still cyclical

Market Summary > Hydratec Industries NV

76,50 EUR


+58.35 (321.49%) ↑ all time

19 Nov, 16:30 CET • Disclaimer

AMS: HYDRA

+ Follow

1D | 5D | 1M | 6M | YTD | 1Y | 5Y | Max



Open	-	Mkt cap	98,90M	52-wk high	79,00
High	-	P/E ratio	24,27	52-wk low	51,00
Low	-	Div yield	2,75%		

What is interesting above is how the Dutch, and many others for that matter, will give up their stock market for a long time. The bad periods above include 1999 to 2005 and 2009 to 2012. Periods when one must accumulate like crazy for long-term wealth accumulation! REMEMBER THAT!

About Hydratec

Machines and plastics

Our core activities

Industrial Systems and Plastic Components form the core activities of Hydratec Industries. Our Industrial Systems companies deliver innovative and sustainable production systems that respond to the needs of a growing and greying world population and increasing prosperity. Our Plastic Components companies deliver innovative plastic components that result in weight and cost savings through metal substitution. The Hydratec Industries companies operate in the Food, Health and Mobility markets.

Industrial Systems

Lan, Royal Pas Reform and Rollepaal are Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) that bring complete machines to market under their own brand names on a project-oriented basis. These machines consist of sustainable production systems that respond to the growing global demand for food and clean drinking water. The greatest added value for our customers is that our solutions are innovative and integrated, thus preventing wastage in production processes. The key sub-markets for Hydratec Industries are the global poultry, convenience food and petfood sectors, and the installation of pipelines for sanitary and clean water.

Plastic Components

Plastic is a relatively recent raw material. Its possibilities of application are still continuously expanding. The demand for plastic products as a metal substitute is steadily increasing. Due to their unique properties they play a unique role in a more sustainable and raw material-efficient future.


Helvoet and Timmerije are intermediate suppliers and develop and produce structural plastic components for Original Equipment Manufacturers. The use of plastics as a metal substitute often results in weight savings and therefore in cost reductions. This helps our customers achieve their sustainability targets. The key markets for Plastic Components are Food, Health and Mobility.

They have 4 companies, so they make acquisitions to grow revenues (I always think why would anyone sell a business cheap?).

Basic EPS from Continuing Operations	4.98	4.72	5.60	6.63	5.16	3.15	1.39
Basic EPS from Discontinued Operations	3.84	—	—	—	—	-2.14	5.21
Total Basic EPS	8.82	4.72	5.60	6.63	5.16	1.01	6.60
▼ Diluted EPS							
Diluted EPS from Continuing Operations	4.98	4.71	5.59	6.62	5.15	3.15	1.39
Diluted EPS from Discontinued Operations	3.84	—	—	—	—	-2.14	0.05
Total Diluted EPS	8.82	4.71	5.59	6.62	5.15	1.01	6.60
Basic Weighted Average Shares Outstanding	1.22	1.25	1.27	1.28	1.29	1.29	1.29

The earnings are very volatile, so they try to grow mostly the corporate way. Which is ok, but I don't see how they can really get to scale with what they are doing, and that would be the key for a long-term competitive business advantage.

Milestones (revenue x €1M)



So, they started growing through acquisitions in 2010.

Relatively thin margins for my taste, not much debt, but...

Financial overview

	2020	2019
Statement of profit or loss		
Net revenue	217,550	219,607
Operating result	6,176	10,240
Net result	2,155	6,635
Cash flow		
From operating activities	25,054	7,170
From investing activities	-5,917	-31,695
From financing activities	-6,622	-4,979
Net cash flow	12,515	-29,504
Balance sheet		
Shareholders' equity attributable to shareholders	63,934	62,700
Shareholders' equity	64,095	63,200
Balance sheet total	199,178	214,268
Key ratios		
Operating result as % of revenue	2.8%	4.7%
Profitability of capital invested	2.9%	6.9%
Profitability of shareholders' equity	3.4%	10.9%
Solvency ratio	32.2%	29.5%
Number of outstanding shares	1,290,944	1,288,178
Earnings per share (in euros)	1.26	5.16
Number of employees	1,206	1,460

Family company, 70% owned by ten Cate!

Reports on shareholdings

The following shareholdings greater than 3%, disclosed in the context of the Dutch Financial Supervision Act, were known at 31 December 2020:

Shareholder	Interest	Date of notification
A. C. ten Cate	23.1%	21 March 2017
F. ten Cate	23.1%	21 March 2017
J. ten Cate	23.1%	21 March 2017
P. C. Van Leeuwen Beheer B.V.	5.7%	9 May 2014
B. F. Aangenendt	5.5%	30 June 2017
M. Spiersma	3.1%	2 December 2014

However, they really operate in specialist niche markets where there aren't many options.

Growth

It is our ambition to continue to grow in terms of quality with the companies we have at present. The key drivers for this are world population growth and the innovative power of the operating companies. Our companies operate in small, specialist markets, are close to the market and respond quickly to changes. In addition, we want to expand and broaden our existing activities through acquisitions and joint operations. Our acquisition strategy on the basis of current activities is that of 'buy and build'. We will dispose of operations which would consistently develop better in other business organisations and therefore have insufficient long-term potential for Hydratec Industries.

Too complex for me.., too risky. Looking for simple, working, profitable and sweet.

ICT GROUP – Delisted

IEX GROUP – MICROCAP

Market Summary > Iex Group NV

2,10 EUR

-10.56 (-83.41%) ↓ all time

22 Nov, 11:30 CET • Disclaimer

AMS: IEX

+ Follow

1D | 5D | 1M | 6M | YTD | 1Y | 5Y | Max



Open	2,10	Mkt cap	7,69M	52-wk high	2,28
High	2,10	P/E ratio	31,91	52-wk low	1,90
Low	2,10	Div yield	-		

Even if it includes beurs.nl, an interesting page for stocks in the NL.

IMCD Stock – CRAZY EXPENSIVE!

IMCD stock goes only up!

Market Summary > Imcd NV

207,90 EUR
 +185.53 (829.37%) ↑ all time

AMS: IMCD

+ Follow

22 Nov, 16:44 CET • Disclaimer

1D | 5D | 1M | 6M | YTD | 1Y | 5Y | Max



Open	204,40	Mkt cap	11,85B	52-wk high	209,80
High	209,80	P/E ratio	-	52-wk low	98,48
Low	204,40	Div yield	0,49%		

MCD NV manufactures and sells a variety of chemicals and food ingredients.

IMCD NV IMCD

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Financials

Export | Ascending

	2011-12	2012-12	2013-12	2014-12	2015-12	2016-12	2017-12	2018-12	2019-12	2020-12	TTM
Revenue EUR Mil	860	1,117	1,233	1,358	1,530	1,715	1,907	2,379	2,690	2,775	3,038
Gross Margin %	21.3	21.3	21.2	21.2	21.8	22.3	22.5	22.5	22.3	23.3	23.9
Operating Income EUR Mil	37	70	73	82	100	114	127	163	178	196	250
Operating Margin %	4.3	6.2	5.9	6.1	6.5	6.6	6.6	6.8	6.6	7.1	8.2
Net Income EUR Mil	-30	-18	-5	20	62	73	77	100	108	121	162
Earnings Per Share EUR	-1.51	-0.89	-0.27	0.79	1.20	1.39	1.47	1.91	2.05	2.24	2.87
Dividends EUR	-	-	-	-	0.20	0.44	0.55	0.62	0.80	0.90	1.02
Payout Ratio % *	-	-	-	-	13.9	33.6	37.7	37.1	37.7	43.9	35.5
Shares Mil	20	20	20	25	52	52	53	52	53	54	56
Book Value Per Share * EUR	-	-	-	-1.30	12.14	12.98	13.62	14.10	15.50	14.89	23.35
Operating Cash Flow EUR Mil	17	33	8	37	86	100	114	114	174	242	280
Cap Spending EUR Mil	-2	-2	-4	-5	-10	-6	-13	-13	-18	-22	-24
Free Cash Flow EUR Mil	15	31	4	32	76	94	101	102	156	220	256
Free Cash Flow Per Share * EUR	-	-	-	0.33	1.24	1.75	2.00	1.40	2.39	2.89	-
Working Capital EUR Mil	113	1	147	215	199	234	192	270	266	291	-

* Indicates calendar year-end data information

Big growth in net income over the years on improving operating margins.

Another cyclical based on macro economics!



Outlook

IMCD operates in different, often fragmented market segments in multiple geographic regions, connecting many customers and suppliers across a very diverse product range. In general, results are impacted by macroeconomic conditions and developments in specific industries. Furthermore, results can be influenced from period to period by, amongst other things, the ability to maintain and expand commercial relationships, the ability to introduce new products and start new customer and supplier relationships and the timing, scope and impact of acquisitions.

IMCD's consistent strategy and resilient business model has led to successful expansion over the years and IMCD remains focused on achieving earnings growth by optimising its services and further strengthening its market positions. IMCD sees interesting opportunities to increase its global footprint and expand its product portfolio both organically and by acquisitions.

Based on the performance in the first nine months of 2021 and the strong fundamentals of its business, IMCD expects operating EBITA growth in 2021.

14



At free cash flows of 256 million compared to a market cap of 11 billion, NO THANK YOU!

ING GROEP – I really don't do banks

InPost – no margin of safety, bet on business model

Market Summary > InPost SA

11,42 EUR


-8.38 (-42.34%) ↓ all time

22 Nov, 17:15 CET • Disclaimer

AMS: INPST

+ Follow

1D | 5D | 1M | 6M | YTD | 1Y | 5Y | Max



Open	11,59	Mkt cap	5,67B	52-wk high	21,38
High	11,70	P/E ratio	-	52-wk low	10,61
Low	11,05	Div yield	-		

Stock just down.

Growing fast.

Inpost SA Ordinary Shares INPST

Morningstar
Stock Investor
Free Download.

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Quote Chart Stock Analysis Performance **Key Ratios** Financials Valuation Insiders Ownership Filings Bonds

Financials

	2011-12	2012-12	2013-12	2014-12	2015-12	2016-12	2017-12	2018-12	2019-12	2020-12	TTM
Revenue PLN Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	483	726	1,232	2,518	3,094
Gross Margin %	—	—	—	—	—	—	90.5	93.3	96.0	97.9	98.0
Operating Income PLN Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	-55	-24	133	633	721
Operating Margin %	—	—	—	—	—	—	-11.6	-3.3	10.9	25.2	23.3
Net Income PLN Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	-212	-15	50	361	430
Earnings Per Share PLN	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.42	-0.03	0.10	0.72	0.86
Dividends PLN	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Payout Ratio % *	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Shares Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	500	500	500	500	500
Book Value Per Share * EUR	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.13
Operating Cash Flow PLN Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	-43	-18	293	743	819
Cap Spending PLN Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	-154	-135	-319	-537	-650
Free Cash Flow PLN Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	-197	-154	-26	206	169
Free Cash Flow Per Share * EUR	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Working Capital PLN Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	-24	-68	-35	-91	—

* Indicates calendar year-end data information

Focused on Poland

Q3 2021 Key Highlights

Strong financial performance and accelerated execution of Pan-European growth strategy



Continuing to Outperform



- Continued outperformance in Q3 with significant market share gains, despite decelerating overall e-commerce market growth.
- Record 44% market share in PL, up 4% compared to Q2
- Despite global inflationary pressures, delivered 670 basis points of YoY adj. EBITDA margin expansion in Poland
- Acceleration of APM expansion in all markets to capture strengthening structural tailwinds - the shift to a digital economy and increasing demand for more convenient, sustainable and cost efficient last-mile deliveries

Strong Q3 2021 Financials



- 111% YoY revenue growth (35% excluding Mondial Relay)
- 73% YoY adj. EBITDA growth (51% excluding Mondial Relay) with 460 bps of underlying YoY margin expansion
- 41% YoY APM volume growth in PL and 260% YoY volume growth in UK

Acceleration of strategy



- Mondial Relay acquisition completed in early Q3
- Record number of lockers deployed in a single quarter
- Added ~5K new merchants in Q3
- > 7.4 million active mobile app users in PL with record NPS (75)
- Accelerated Green City Program
- Announced key partnerships in UK with Tesco and eBay


out of the box

4

Business model based on lockers.

Accelerating the flywheel effect in Poland in Q3 2021

Strengthening our competitive advantage to support long-term sustainable growth



Will that work profitably and is it scalable?

As long as they can deliver almost for free to your doorstep, this seems risky. Of course, if it works the returns will be great, but that is a big if. NO MARGIN OF SAFETY

They are trying to grow and scale



Accelerating the flywheel in the U.K. with strong sequential momentum

Network density continues to improve, APM usage accelerates, major new partnership with Tesco

UK Quarterly APM Deployments

>13x new APMs in Q3 2021 vs Q3 2020



31 major brands added



Merchant A – Share of Checkout



Acceleration in ramp-up of volumes for new APMS

New APM volume up 140% in Q3 vs Q2 and almost 5x vs Q1



New partnership signed with Tesco

- Aiming to deploy APMs at up to **500** Tesco stores nationwide **by end of November**
- 155** activated by end of September



Rain Lock

out of the box Note: (1) Increase in share of checkout measured over a 4 month period

But what about rain, I don't see a roof above, then lockers, ice snow etc... Too complex for me.

Intertrust Stock – too much debt.

Market Summary > Intertrust NV

17,32 EUR

+1.95 (12.69%) ↑ all time

22 Nov, 17:23 CET • Disclaimer

AMS: INTER

+ Follow

1D | 5D | 1M | 6M | YTD | 1Y | 5Y | Max



Open	16,82	Mkt cap	1,57B	52-wk high	17,56
High	17,46	P/E ratio	27,38	52-wk low	11,34
Low	16,78	Div yield	-		

Up 50% from bottom in just 3 months! But the stock went nowhere over the last 5 years.

Intertrust is a publicly traded international trust and corporate management company based in Amsterdam, Netherlands. The company is best known for its fiduciary services, which includes tax, trust, business management and outsourcing processes. It is the largest trust office in the Netherlands.

Financials

Slightly declining margins, but high cash flows of around 150 million per year. That is a 10% yield on the current market cap.

Intertrust NV INTER



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Quote Chart Stock Analysis Performance **Key Ratios** Financials Valuation Insiders Ownership Filings Bonds

Financials

	2011-12	2012-12	2013-12	2014-12	2015-12	2016-12	2017-12	2018-12	2019-12	2020-12	TTM
Revenue EUR Mil	147	182	190	297	345	386	485	496	543	564	569
Gross Margin %	58.7	61.3	65.8	66.0	66.0	66.0	66.1	65.4	64.4	62.3	62.0
Operating Income EUR Mil	31	42	36	84	107	102	133	131	132	113	129
Operating Margin %	20.8	22.9	18.7	28.4	31.1	26.5	27.4	26.3	24.4	20.0	22.7
Net Income EUR Mil	9	19	-9	6	3	52	88	89	90	21	58
Earnings Per Share EUR	0.16	0.35	-0.17	0.11	0.12	0.58	0.94	0.99	1.00	0.23	0.63
Dividends EUR	—	—	—	—	—	0.24	0.53	0.63	0.62	—	—
Payout Ratio % *	—	—	—	—	—	—	61.3	62.9	56.3	100.0	—
Shares Mil	55	55	55	55	22	90	94	91	91	91	91
Book Value Per Share * EUR	—	—	—	—	0.06	7.44	7.90	8.00	8.62	8.35	9.35
Operating Cash Flow EUR Mil	56	-107	36	108	128	152	157	185	187	175	138
Cap Spending EUR Mil	-3	-4	-5	-12	-13	-11	-8	-10	-12	-19	-16
Free Cash Flow EUR Mil	52	-111	30	96	114	141	149	175	175	157	122
Free Cash Flow Per Share * EUR	—	—	—	—	2.00	1.43	1.59	1.72	1.85	2.06	—
Working Capital EUR Mil	22	-182	5	18	83	34	56	87	-17	77	—

* Indicates calendar year-end data information

Q3 2021 Highlights



0.6% underlying revenue growth in Q3; continue to see strong pipeline and inflow

KEY HIGHLIGHTS

- Revenue amounted to EUR 140.3m, +0.6% on an underlying basis
- +4.4% underlying revenue growth excl. Netherlands and Luxembourg
- Strong pipeline developments (+20% y-o-y); deals won with EUR 18.2m annual contract value
- 9M normalised adjusted EBITA margin was 32.1% compared to 32.2% in 9M 2020

MARKET TRENDS


- Global trend of high employee attrition rates; 'The Great Resignation'
- Geographic diversification is proving critical to achieving growth in Corporate Services
- Rise of larger, more complex Fund Services mandates shows no sign of slowing
- Transformation and compliance excellence are key to success but come at a short-term cost

SERVICE LINES

- Corporates: broadly flat, growth mainly driven by Jersey, UK and Cayman Islands
- Funds: double digit underlying growth in Fund Admin; encouraging trends in Fund SPV Services
- Capital Markets: supported by solid growth in Luxembourg, Jersey and APAC
- Private Wealth: continued to be impacted by directed outflow; solid performance in APAC

EXECUTION

- Remediation project progressing; committed to complete activities by end 2022 and within budget
- Full EUR 20m synergies from CoE migrations realised; committed to drive further savings
- Initiated EUR 100m share buyback programme
- Reiterate 2021 guidance and mid-term aspirations




The low price of a few months ago could be related to debt issues.



Net debt, leverage and liquidity

Strong balance sheet and continued net debt reduction

Net debt & leverage ratio



EUR m	31.12.2020	31.09.2021
Total debt, of which:	903.9	889.3
- Term Loans, RCF and overdrafts in cash pool	402.8	388.2
- Senior Notes	501.1	501.1
Cash attributable to the Company	111.2	123.7
Total Net Debt	792.7	765.6

Share buyback

- Initiated EUR 100m share buyback programme
- Demonstrates confidence in long-term prospects and reflecting the strong cash generation, whilst maintaining financial flexibility
- Bought back 214,555 shares for an aggregate amount of EUR 2.9 million until 15 October 2021

Leverage and headroom

- Leverage ratio reduced to 3.60x as at the end of Q3 2021
- On track to reduce leverage ratio to around 3.0x in the medium term

Financing and liquidity

- Total liquidity amounted to EUR 257.0m
- Net Debt reduced by EUR 27.1m to EUR 765.6m as of Sep 30, 2021 from EUR 792.7m at Dec 31, 2020

When you have much debt, you are simply controlled by your debtors. In a bad period, they become the owners of the business.

Maybe they don't count the financial expense in the FCF.

Consolidated Profit/(Loss) (unaudited)

(€k)

	Q3 2021	Q3 2020	9M 2021	9M 2020
Revenue	140,293	138,060	423,989	419,635
Staff expenses	(73,809)	(71,714)	(219,110)	(215,347)
Rental expenses	(1,907)	(1,730)	(6,248)	(6,016)
Other operating expenses	(21,529)	(19,127)	(65,914)	(57,738)
Other operating income	35	169	302	2,066
Depreciation and amortisation of other intangible assets	(6,574)	(7,684)	(21,791)	(22,992)
Amortisation of acquisition-related intangible assets and impairment of goodwill	(12,463)	(12,114)	(36,783)	(61,127)
Profit from operating activities	24,046	25,860	74,445	58,481
Financial income	20	310	9,555	1,342
Financial expense	(9,179)	(4,732)	(28,101)	(46,715)
Financial result¹	(9,159)	(4,422)	(18,546)	(45,373)
Profit/(loss) before income tax	14,887	21,438	55,899	13,108
Income tax	(3,750)	(4,832)	(12,948)	(7,165)
Profit/(loss) after tax	11,137	16,606	42,951	5,943

¹ Reported financial result included a positive revaluation of the early redemption option of the senior notes in 9M 2021 of EUR 7.3m (9M 2020: EUR 14.3m negative) and net interest expenses of EUR 26.0m (9M 2020: EUR 26.0m)


Too risky!

JDE Peet's Stock

I remember when I was a kid how we collected stamps from the back of coffee and tea bags from them. Hahahaha

Jacobs Douwe Egberts is a Dutch company that owns numerous beverage brands. It was formed in 2015 following the merger of the coffee division of Mondelez International with Douwe Egberts. It has about 10% of the global coffee market.

It is a recent IPO and things haven't been great since.



Nothing but down for the stock.

No growth, improving net income but stable cash flows. However, the management is forecasting growth ahead.

JDE Peets NV Ordinary Shares JDEP | [Morningstar Rating](#)

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	2011-12	2012-12	2013-12	2014-12	2015-12	2016-12	2017-12	2018-12	2019-12	2020-12	TTM
Revenue EUR Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	6,530	6,664	6,945	6,651	6,669
Gross Margin %	—	—	—	—	—	—	39.9	42.9	43.3	42.6	43.8
Operating Income EUR Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	707	909	1,043	933	1,079
Operating Margin %	—	—	—	—	—	—	10.8	13.6	15.0	14.0	16.2
Net Income EUR Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	318	473	424	308	571
Earnings Per Share EUR	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.64	0.95	0.86	0.79	1.10
Dividends EUR	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Payout Ratio % *	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Shares Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	495	495	495	387	505
Book Value Per Share * EUR	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	20.46	20.74
Operating Cash Flow EUR Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	921	1,313	1,459	1,129	1,271
Cap Spending EUR Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	-236	-282	-281	-252	-243
Free Cash Flow EUR Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	685	1,031	1,178	877	1,028
Free Cash Flow Per Share * EUR	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.31	—
Working Capital EUR Mil	—	—	—	—	—	—	-664	-1,107	-1,296	-1,513	—

* Indicates calendar year-end data information

1 billion of free cash flow on 13 billion is nothing bad, but not stellar.

Analysts (Jefferies) have a [sell rating](#) on the stock based on the 70% increase in coffee prices that the company will not be able to transfer to customers. Similarly Neslte suffered too in 2012 and 2015 according to the analyst. On the other hand, ING has a buy rating with a 46 EUR target.

Of course, since, Nestle is 4x and 2x respectively, - that much about analysts' short-term focus.

Market Summary > Nestle SA

121,44 CHF

+110.28 (988.17%) ↑ all time

24 Nov, 09:54 CET • Disclaimer

SWX: NESN

+ Follow

1D | 5D | 1M | 6M | YTD | 1Y | 5Y | Max




Open	121,98	Mkt cap	341,85B	CDP score	A-
High	121,98	P/E ratio	27,83	52-wk high	124,16
Low	121,18	Div yield	2,26%	52-wk low	95,00


For JDE stock, the pressure could also come from Mondelez selling JDE stock through convertible bonds that can be [converted in 2 years](#). That should increase the float long-term, but also allows for speculation as you can arbitrage between bonds and going short perhaps. [Trott has](#) also been selling 3% of the company. It looks like the previous owners are selling to monetize their investment and putting pressure on the stock.

Downgrades on higher coffee prices for 2021/2022 - [Barenberg](#), [Deutsche](#), [JPM](#), - all because they see no catalysts that will push the stock higher short term. Only [Kepler](#) is positive on the business model long-term.

Anyway, the question is – will they be able to grow their brand, scale operations and consequently profits! If the negative pressure on the stock continues but the business does good, things should be interesting from an investing perspective.



The market is highly competitive. Even if they say the opposite:



Remember monopolists? They never wish to tell anybody they have a monopoly – while those that dream about a great business, but have a mediocre one, always try to present it as a monopoly!!!!

They want to grow in the US and China – that is easier said than done – where were they in the last 2 decades???



If they can grow net income at 7%, that would be great! But, you have to have a much higher return on invested capital than they have had.

Profitability	2011-12	2012-12	2013-12	2014-12	2015-12	2016-12	2017-12	2018-12	2019-12	2020-12	TTM
Tax Rate %	—	—	—	—	—	—	15.46	7.27	30.44	46.58	36.36
Net Margin %	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.87	7.10	6.11	4.63	8.56
Asset Turnover (Average)	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.29	0.30	0.32	0.31	0.32
Return on Assets %	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.41	2.14	1.95	1.45	2.70
Financial Leverage (Average)	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.93	2.74	3.39	2.03	2.02
Return on Equity %	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.02	6.06	5.92	3.70	5.53
Return on Invested Capital %	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.14	4.38	3.68	2.75	4.06
Interest Coverage	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.73	3.29	4.08	4.32	5.92

This means the new ventures should improve profitability.

OUR AMBITION: ATTRACTIVE VALUE CREATION YEAR OVER YEAR

2021	2022 & Beyond
"A normalized year"	"A pure player algorithm"
Organic Sales Growth 3 – 5%	Organic Sales Growth 3 – 5%
Organic Adjusted EBIT Growth Low-Single-Digit, with A&P catch-up	Organic Adjusted EBIT Growth Mid-Single-Digit
Leverage < 3x	FCF conversion ~70%
Proposed dividend €0.70	Intended dividend Stable to growing over time

15

Dividend yield is 2.69%, plus 7% growth, you are at 10% long-term returns! Not bad, but...

JDE has about 10% of the coffee market globally, plus the tea and offers the combination there too. The thing is that it is actually difficult to reach scale or reliability in the market as coffee is not that easy to grow or procure. Plus the value of the supply chain, brand, distribution, position with retailers and customers – not easy to change.

The China and U.S. Expansion!

If they can grow there, take market share, that should increase net profits and long-term positioning.

WE WILL INVEST AHEAD OF THE CURVE TO CAPTURE THESE GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES

2021



Drive investments back to 2019 levels

-  A&P spend (esp. Working Media)
-  Appliance investment

Ambition over next 3 years

U.S.

- Accelerate Peet's ambition to become in-home Coffee powerhouse in the U.S.
- Invest behind new growth opportunities across channels

Greater China

- Turbo-charge Peet's retail store expansion
- Invest behind our Premium brand equity for In Home
- Innovation for & by China
- Build out our existing partnership with Hillhouse Capital, on the back of Philips DA sale

Digital Commerce

- Double our dedicated capabilities and invest in automated systems
- Double the weight of digital media spend

Others

- Speed up our appliance's innovation rhythm
- Office reopening & reinvention
- Emerging Markets talent & capability
- ESG as a growth enabler




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The competition in the US. A [nice comparison](#), I must say I am more of a Peets person than the caramelly Starbucks.

MAJOR HEADROOM AHEAD

Plenty of room to keep growing household penetration

Household Penetration of US brand (2016-20)



Year	Household Penetration (pts)	Brand
2016	3.9	Peet's
2019	5.4	Peet's
2020	6.1	Peet's
	14.7	DUNKIN'
	32.0	Starbucks


Initiatives & Investments to capture the growth opportunity

GROW THE CORE

- Supply chain expansion
- K-Cup, R&G extensions
- Continued ESG progress
- Systems and organization


ADD NEW PRODUCTS


- Expand Aluminum capsule portfolio
- New technologies
- Ready-to-drink



ACCELERATE E-COMMERCE

- Digital & Performance marketing
- Building Amazon expertise
- Supply chain evolution






23

If they can lower debt 1.5 billion in a year, that is a lot of value creation. Thus the business is making money, which is a great start.

CAPITAL ALLOCATION PRIORITY #2 – DELEVERAGING

#2 - We target an optimal leverage of around 2.5x




Strong track record of deleveraging

Well positioned to reach a leverage ratio of below 3.0x in the course of 2021, as we move towards our optimal leverage of around 2.5x




Let's hope rates don't go up for them prior to 2023.

THE NEW FINANCING IMPROVES OUR DEBT STRUCTURE AND LIQUIDITY PROFILE



New financing provides a permanent capital structure with additional liquidity of EUR 0.5 bn (EUR 1.6 bn pro forma Dec 20) and bond market access

The worked already on the above so no worries there.




This will push the stock higher when they start doing buybacks and the previous owners have finished reducing their significant stakes.

CAPITAL ALLOCATION PRIORITIES

Organic growth	Invest behind organic growth opportunities within our existing business to support growth
Optimal leverage	Target an optimal leverage of around 2.5x
Inorganic growth	Continue to pursue inorganic growth opportunities, but always in line with our highly selective business and financial criteria. While our leverage is above our optimal leverage, we will not prioritize transformational cash or debt funded acquisitions.
Return of cash to shareholders	Expect our excess cash to contribute to shareholder remuneration through stable dividend flows, sustainably growing over time
Share repurchase	We do not prioritise share repurchases while leverage is above our optimal leverage of 2.5x

A billion to go!



Ok, I still have to learn more about the growth potential of the business but when the buybacks kick in, growth comes and 2022 passes where coffee prices are lower for 2023, we could see reratings, higher demand for the stock and a stock much higher. This one I will follow closely, plus the stock is making good money.

Valuation

JDE Peets

STOCK VALUE LIST^1A1

Scenario	Dividend in millions	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	Terminal Value	Growth rate		
Scenario 1 normal case	360.00	385.20	412.16	441.02	471.89	504.92	540.26	578.08	618.55	661.85	708.17	19855.36	7%	next 5 years	
	10%)	350.18	340.63	331.34	322.30	313.51	304.96	296.65	288.56	280.69	273.03	7655.10	10%	Discount rate	
	INTRINSIC VALUE	10756.96												30.0	Terminal multiple
Scenario 2 best case	FCF in billion	1.00	1.07	1.14	1.23	1.31	1.40	1.50	1.61	1.72	1.84	1.97	20.22	7%	next 5 years
	10%)	0.34	0.33	0.32	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.27	7.80	10%	Discount rate	
	Present value sum	10.81												11.0	Terminal multiple
Scenario 3 worst case	Dividend in millions	360.00	378.00	396.90	416.75	437.58	459.46	482.43	506.56	531.88	558.48	586.40	16754.34	5%	next 5 years
	MARGIN OF SAFETY	10%)	343.64	328.02	313.11	298.87	285.29	272.32	259.94	248.13	236.85	226.08	6459.53	10%	Discount rate
	Present value sum	9271.77												30.0	Terminal multiple

Scenario	Probability	PV	Part
Scenario 1 (normal case)	0.6	#####	6454.18
Scenario 2 (best case)	0.2	10.81	2.16
Scenario 3 (worst case)	0.2	9271.77	1854.35
Sum			8310.69

SVEN CARLIN

RESEARCH PLATFORM

Disclaimer: This is just for educational purposes and not for investing advice!

With the high cash valuation, it is unlikely this will trade for long around 13 billion in market capitalization because it is interesting for LBOs and also Buffett. Thus if it goes down to 11, 10 billion it becomes an interesting buy.

I have played a bit with scenarios above!, of course, it all depends on valuation, it is not one to buy for the 2.69% dividend, but a Peter Lynch cycle buy is in the making here.

Just Eat Takeaway

Just Eat Takeaway Stock Price Overview

Just Eat Takeaway stock (TKWY) has enjoyed a very exuberant period up to October 2020, only to fall 44% since. Such a decline is often the name of the game with growth stocks but we as value investors have to focus on the real earnings power of the underlying business.

Market Summary > Just Eat Takeaway.com NV

61,51 EUR

+37.01 (151.06%) ↑ all time

24 Nov, 17:35 CET • Disclaimer

AMS: TKWY

+ Follow



Open	61,94	Mkt cap	13,07B	52-wk high	102,50
High	62,98	P/E ratio	-	52-wk low	58,87
Low	60,32	Div yield	-		

TKWY stock price – historical chart

The decline since October 2020 is partially because of the all stock acquisition of Grubhub (Nasdaq: GRUB) where legal issues plagued the fresh acquisition (fee cap). Just before the Covid crisis, Takeaway also [acquired Just Eat](#) for \$7.8 billion in another all-stock deal where it beat a cash offer from Prosus.

Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Business Overview

The company has 98 million active customers and 588 thousand restaurants that are part of its ecosystem. It is a hybrid business model that offers a marketplace as a platform for restaurants and the standard delivery option if the restaurant doesn't do it self.

We are a global leader in online food delivery

- 25 Countries
- 1.0bn Orders^{1,2}
- €26bn GTV^{1,2}
- 588k Restaurants^{2,3}
- 98m Active Consumers²


Source: Company information for H1 2021.
Note 1: 1.7M as per H1 2021.
Note 2: Excluding Colombia, Brazil and Slovakia.
Note 3: Partnered restaurants only (for which there is a contract).

Capital Markets Day JUST EAT Takeaway.com

Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Source: [Company Presentation](#)

The business is based on five markets for now: US, Canada, UK, Netherlands and Germany where 80% of the GTV is made.

Our core business is concentrated around a few key markets





Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Source: [Company Presentation](#)

Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Business Assumptions and Risks

The business model assumes that half of us will order food 5 times a month. For me, such an assumption is a big risk when it comes to investing in TKWY or GRUB stock. We don't know whether ordering food will penetrate our habits that much or not. Plus, there is the whole logistics issues part surrounding 6 times current deliveries.

We already serve a big part of the population in our markets, but still have significant further headroom for growth



At 50% penetration and monthly order frequency of 5, our business would be over 6x larger


¹ Active consumers over addressable population (15+) as on H1 2021. Population data from Michael Bauer Research.
² Monthly orders by the number of consumers who have placed at least one order in that month. Based on a 6-month rolling average for 2021 half year and 12-month rolling average for full year.

Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Source: [Company Presentation](#)

By being the largest in some markets, they also assume they will win most of the customers. However, for me that is another risk because nothing prevents another player to spend 369 million EUR on [marketing](#) like Just Eat Takeaway did in 2020..

Our orders are highly recurring, generated by a loyal base of consumers

Orders by cohort¹ (Group excl. US)



- Most of the orders for any food delivery company are from existing consumers
- Consumers are highly recurring and order more frequently over time
- The battle in food delivery is therefore around winning new consumers


The ability to gain new consumers is a function of scale – the biggest player typically gains the most new consumers

¹ Cohort refers to consumers grouped by the calendar year in which they each first placed an order with Just Eat Takeaway.com.

Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Source: [Company Presentation](#) (annotation by author)

The plan is to reach a significant amount of scale that would allow for lower marketing costs in relation to revenues. For now, scale is not an issue for the company as it is the leading brand in most of Europe and North America.

We have leading positions across our markets...



Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Source: [Company Presentation](#)

Unfortunately, fast growing businesses have no margin of safety as it takes time to build a strong moat, especially in fast new growing tech models. Even less when it comes to businesses that are losing money because then somebody else can erode your business with the same tactics, or they can just compromise your profitability plans and nullify the initial effort you made to build scale. Grubhub is still growing but has been seeing market erosion in the US.




Grubhub has two principal challenges...

Market share erosion

- Grubhub has experienced some share erosion over the past years, including pre-pandemic
- Primarily driven by a lack of supply, particularly in branded restaurants / QSRs
- Pandemic accelerated this as demand shifted from inner cities to suburbs...
- ...and impacted our significant corporate business, which has yet to fully recover

Introduction of fee caps

- Since April 2020, ~100 cities / counties have implemented some form of temporary fee cap
- Many have or are expected to expire in 2021, but a few important ones remain, including New York, San Francisco, and Philadelphia
- These have disproportionately impacted Grubhub given geographic exposure and restaurant mix



Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Source: [Company Presentation](#) (annotation by author)

Apart from competition, Grubhub has been impacted by ‘fee caps’ where the government wants to limit fees to 15% of the restaurant’s price. Grubhub is opposing the decision in court but whatever

the court’s decision, when you have such margins that are higher than 15% of the restaurant’s cost, there will always be a lot of competition for your margins and therefore this increases the risks related to the sustainability of the business model.

Let’s see how the above fits an investing perspective and what should the business achieve from a financial standpoint to justify investing in it at current levels.

Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis - Financials


The delivery business is not yet profitable and requires constant testing but that is normal for all new and fast growing business models, especially tech platforms.

We have rectified prior underinvestment and UK losses have peaked




Revenue and cost per order

- Rapid expansion of Delivery
- Increased marketing spend
- Price leadership
- Improved marketing CPO
- Price optimisation
- Efficiency improvements



Monthly Adj. EBITDA



note: Company information.

Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Source: [Company Presentation](#)

The management states Just Eat Takeaway has a clear path towards EBITDA margins in excess of 5%.



Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Source: [Company Presentation](#)

However, the above implies all things going according to plan for a long period of time. If growth is slower than expected, where short-term growth has been slowing, business might not double over the next 5 years which would compromise valuation models.

Our strategy delivers sustainable growth and profits

	Short-Term	Long-Term
Growth	We will grow GTV in the mid-teens in 2022	We will add more than €30bn in annual GTV over the next 5 years
Profitability	Current year will be the peak year of losses, with 2022 group Adj. EBITDA/GTV margin improving to the range of -0.6% to -0.8%	We will achieve a long-term group Adj. EBITDA margin in excess of 5% as a percent of GTV

We prioritise long-term growth over short-term profits

Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Source: [Company Presentation](#)

Up till now, as the business grew, so did losses and negative cash flows.

Just Eat Takeaway.com NV TKWY | Morningstar Rating

Morningstar
FundInvestor
Free Download.

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Quote Chart Stock Analysis Performance **Key Ratios** Financials Valuation Insiders Ownership Filings Bonds

Financials

Export Ascending

	2011-12	2012-12	2013-12	2014-12	2015-12	2016-12	2017-12	2018-12	2019-12	2020-12	TTM
Revenue EUR Mil	—	—	23	47	77	112	166	232	416	2,042	3,135
Gross Margin %	—	—	88.4	90.0	90.4	86.0	83.8	81.2	73.3	55.7	42.0
Operating Income EUR Mil	—	—	-3	-6	-18	-25	-36	-33	-75	-107	-451
Operating Margin %	—	—	-12.5	-13.4	-23.4	-22.7	-21.7	-14.1	-18.0	-5.2	-14.4
Net Income EUR Mil	—	—	-2	-7	-20	-31	-42	-14	-115	-151	-578
Earnings Per Share EUR	—	—	-0.05	-0.16	-0.36	-0.84	-0.97	-0.32	-1.99	-1.07	-3.74
Dividends EUR	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Payout Ratio % *	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Shares Mil	—	—	44	44	54	37	43	43	58	140	152
Book Value Per Share * EUR	—	—	—	—	—	0.88	3.89	3.16	19.46	57.93	62.89
Operating Cash Flow EUR Mil	—	—	—	-3	-4	-3	-36	-3	-64	177	-151
Cap Spending EUR Mil	—	—	—	—	-2	-13	-4	-5	-8	-43	-59
Free Cash Flow EUR Mil	—	—	—	-4	-5	-17	-40	-7	-72	134	-210
Free Cash Flow Per Share * EUR	—	—	—	—	—	-0.02	-0.72	-0.70	-0.97	0.66	—
Working Capital EUR Mil	—	—	-1	3	-14	102	64	-125	-106	63	—

* Indicates calendar year-end data information

Just Eat Takeaway Stock Analysis – Financials - [Morningstar](#)

If they deliver on 60 billion EUR in GTV with a 5% EBITDA margin, that would result in EBITDA of 3 billion EUR. The market would certainly value it much differently than now. I would assume at least a price to EBITDA of 10 or maybe even 15 if the business is still growing at double digits. This would lead to a market capitalization of at least 30 billion to 45 billion compared to the current 13 billion EUR.

Just Eat Takeaway Stock Investment Conclusion

From a relative perspective, you could say that a company trading at 3 times sales while being a tech platform is cheap. Also, Wolt was recently acquired by DoorDash at 3.2 GTV which would imply a 90 billion EUR valuation for What To Eat Takeaway stock.

Unfortunately, from an absolute investing perspective, where we focus on real earnings, Just Eat Takeaway stock is far from being a good investment. The management's bullish long-term view makes it look cheap but even if the market capitalization triples in 10 years, that is a return of just 11.6% per year which is not stellar for the risks taken. That is below average [targeted returns](#) for venture capitalists expect. Given that Just Eat Takeaway stock offers typical venture capitalist risks and rewards, it isn't really cheap from that perspective.

To summarize, the main risks taken by investing in Just Eat Takeaway stock are the following:

- Uncertain business model – we cannot know there is long-term sustainable earnings power in the sector, nor who will be the winner take it all.
- The company can grow at 15% per year, but if they grow like they have been doing up till now, with all-stock acquisitions, the dilution could significantly impact shareholder returns.
- The current loss-making businesses and focus on reaching scale might not work as planned and require many more financing rounds for more dilution.

Of course, on a relative short-term perspective, if the business grows faster than expected and the current market pessimism towards tech platform stocks turns positive again, the stock can easily

double and go back to where it was in October of 2020, but that is just pure speculation. From a fundamental perspective, I would avoid Just Eat Takeaway stock, even for VC style speculators.